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the office demands a combination of exceptional characteristics. If
the possessor of such qualifications is to have his reputation and his
estate endangered by stringent'laws and captious beneficiaries the
result must be a paucity of trustees. Another inevitable result of
such a state of the law will be idle trust funds. Where lies the
remedy ? Certainly not in giving loose rein to trustees of a specu-
lative turn of mind. Possibly not in shifting the responsibilities
of trustees to the courts. But probably in giving to trust instru-
ments that will permit of it a more liberal construction. In other
words, the measure of capacity demanded of a trustee in the invest-
ment of trust funds should be an exercise of the diligence, care and
prudence of men of discretion and intelligence in their own like
affairs, and the measure of any further liability should be found only




Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
DE VOIN v. MICHIGAN LUMBER CO.
Where by a contract of hiring, the owner of a team sends his own servant to drive,
he is only responsible for the acts of such driver in the handling of the team while
being used in the stipulated employment, and where the team is lost while being used
in a way, or at a place, or for a purpose not contemplated in the contract, the hirer
cannot escape liability to the owner by showing that the driver consented to such use,
or that the driver's negligence contributed to the loss.
A. hired his team and driver to B., to haul logs, and by the direction of C., B.'s
foreman, the driver went to haul hay, and under the guidance of C., in going to a
hay stack, drove over the snow-covered ice on the river, which broke through and
the horses were drowned: Held, that B. was liable to A. for the value of the
horses.
APPEAL from Circuit Court, Marathon County.
Plaintiff resided at Rhinelander and owned the span of horses in
question, and had a hired man to drive them. Ddfendant hired
the team and driver of plaintiff at a stipulated price per month.
Defendant was engaged in lumbering at two different camps, Rocky
Run and Sugar Camp. After being engaged some days in hauling
supplies to Sugar Camp, defendant asked for permission to haul logs
at Rocky Run, which was granted and the team and driver were
accordingly sent there. After hauling logs there one day, defend-
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ant's foreman directed the driver to haul some hay from a place on
the river some ten miles distant, and sent a man along to show the
way. In driving to the stack, the driverpassed across water which
had been frozen over, and covered with snow. The ice broke through
and both horses were drowned. This action is to recover their
value. Judgment was for plaintiff below, and defendant appeals.
L. A. Pradt and NYeal Brown, for respondent, J. L. De Voin.
Grace & Craven, for appellant, Michigan Lumber Co.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CASSODAY, J.-The court stated to the jury that it was admitted
or proved by uncontradicted evidence, that at the time of the acci-
dent the team and driver "1 were in the employ of the defendant
* * * for the purpose of hauling logs." It is now claimed that
this was a controverted question of fact for the jury to determine.
The only witness of the defendant on tliat question testified, in
effect, that he, in behalf of the defendant, made the contract of
hire with the plaintiff; that he hired the team and driver "to haul
logs, and to haul supplies to Sugar Camp or Rocky Run, just as he
was a mind to have him." It is undisputed that for the time being
the team and driver had stopped hauling supplies, and had gone
to Rocky Run for the express purpose of hauling logs, and had
hauled logs there for one day. There is no claim nor any testi-
mony to support any claim, of any express contract with the
plaintiff, that the team should be used in hauling supplies from any
other place than Rhinelander. The defendant did give evidence
tending to prove that, by the general custom in the vicinity, it was
understood that when a team was hired to haul logs, it included the
right to use the same to haul a load of supplies, or a load of hay,
or anything of that description. The court was very liberal in its
allowance of evidence of such general custom. The plaintiff de-
nied any knowledge of the existence of any such custom. The
question whether such custom existed was fairly submitted to the
jury. The verdict for the plaintiff negatived the existence of such
custom, and established the fact as a verity, that by the express
contract of hire the team whs only to be used in hauling supplies
from Rhinelander, or logs at Rocky Run.
The defendant requested the court to instruct the jury, in effect,
that the driver was the agent of the plaintiff: that his consent to
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go.for the hay, was the consent of the plaintiffs, and henc6 that he
could not recover; and that if the injury occurred through the
driver's negligence, then the plaintiff could not recover. For the
refusal to give such several instructions, errors are -assigned.
In a limited sense the driver was the agent of the plaititiff. He
was such agent in caring for and driving the team, in hauling sup-
plies from Rhinelander, and logs at Rocky Run. That included
the proper feeding and handling of the team. He was only twenty-
two years of age, but had some experience in driving teams.
There is no claim nor evidence tending to prove that he was negli-
gent in the act of handling the team. There was a road to the
first stack. It had been cut by the guide sent with the driver.
Near the first stack the road was along on the ice on the river.
There was no difficulty in getting to the first stack. Between that
stack and the other stack there was no road nor any broken path. It
seems to have been, or at least a portion of it, right along on the
river. But the water was frozen over, and the ice was covered with
snow. The space between the two stacks appeared to be level snow,
and there was no unusual appearance around or about the place
where the accident occurred. The driver had never been there
before. .There is no evidence that there was any safer way, or any.
other way to the second stack. There is no evidence that the team
was not driven properly, and in the way directed by the guide, who
appears to have known of the locus in quo. The age of the guide
is not given, but he was selected by the defendant's foreman for the
purposes indicated. The accident did not occur by reason of any
negligence in the mere driving or handling of the team, but in obey-
ing the directions given by the foreman and guide, and driving the
team into a dangerous place without 'knowing it to be dangerous.
If the driver was negligent at all, it was in obeying directions and
driving out upon the ice for the first time without first testing its
strength. If the guide was negligent in walking behind the sled
while being driven to the second stack, instead of going ahead of
the team and testing the ice, yet, as the service in which they were
then engaged, was not such as was contemplated in the contract of
hire, he was not a co-employee with the driver in such a sense as to
relieve the defendant from liability on account of such negligence:
Railroad Co. v. Fort, 17 Wall. 553; Mann v. Oriental P. W., 11
R. I. 152; Lalor v. Ohicago, B. & Q. Rd. Co., 52 Ill. 401.
Was the driver the agent of the plaintiff in the act of obeying
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the directions of the defendant's foreman and guide, at a place dis-
tant from the camp, and in a kind of work not contemplated by the
contract of hire ? It seems to us that he was not. Of course, the
driver was selected by the plaintiff to drive the team in performing
the work contemplated in the contract of hire. Had the injury
occurred by reason of any negligence or incompetency of the driver
while engaged in the work or service so contemplated by the con-
tract of hire, then the loss would have fallen upon the plaintiff; for,
by selecting him to drive his team, he had taken upon himself the
responsibility of the requisite care and competency of the person so
selected in doing the work he had contracted to have him do:
Quarman v. Burnett, 6 Mees. & W. 499 ; Jones v. iayor, &e.,
14 Q. B. Div. 890; Huff v. .Ford, 126 Mass. 24; Joslin v.
Grand Rapids I. Co., 50 Mich. 516. And yet, while engaged in
such contemplated work, had the team been injured solely, by
reason of having been driven by the careless direction of the
defendant, into some place of danger, not obvious to the senses and
unknown to the driver, there would be no question of the defend-
ant's liability: lndermauer v. Dames, L. R., 2 C. P. 311. In
such contempl4ted service the defendant was still under obliga-
tion to exercise reasonable diligence in providing a suitable place
for the team to be driven; or in other words, not to carelessly cause
the team to be driven into a place of concealed danger unknown
to the driver: Id. ; Coombs v. iew Bedford C. (o., 102 Mass.
583, 584; Swoboda v. Ward, 40 Mich. 423; Parkhurst v. John-
son, 50 Id. 70. In case of injury in such contemplated service, the
mere fact that the driver was, in a limited sense, the agent of
the plaintiff, as indicated, would not take away the liability of
the defendant, under whose orders and control he was acting at the
time, for negligently inducing him to drive into a place of con-
cealed danger: Rouke v. White KT. . Co., 2 0. P. Div. 205.
But the case at bar is more favorable for the plaintiff than any
supposed. Here the injury occurred when neither the team nor the
driver were engaged in the work contemplated in the contract of hire.
They were both, however, doing service for the defendant under the
directions of its foreman, and the guide selected by him. The team
was drowned solely by reason of being driven by such direction into
a place of concealed danger unknown to the driver. Iad not the
team at the time of the injury been accompanied and driven by the
driver selected and employed by the plaintiff, there could be no
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question but what such diverted use of the team would have been a
conversion within all the authorities: Wheelock v. Wheelwright,
5 Mass. 104; Homer v. Thurng, 8 Pick. 492 ; Ball v. Corcoran,
107 Mass. 251; Woodman v. Hubbard, 25 N. H. 67; Hart v.
Skinner, 16 Vt. 188. The same rule has been applied to the
unauthorized use of slaves: .lorseley v. Branch, 1 Humph. 199;
Scruggs v. Davis, 5 Sneed 261; Moseley v. Wilkinson, 24 Ala.
411 ; Fail v. 2ifcArthur, 31 Id. 26 ; Spencer v. Pilher, 8 Leigh
566. For the loss during such diversion or misuse, the defendant
would have been absolutely liable, even though it occurred by reason
of the fault of the horses or a mere accident: -Lucas v. Trumbull,
15 Gray 806 ; Perhamv. Coney, 117 Mass. 102 ; Fisher v. Kyle,
27 Mich. 454; Lane v. Cameron, 38 Wis. 603. Does the mere
fact that the driver consented to the diversion of employment, and
was in the act of driving the team when the accident occurred,
relieve the defendant from the liability which would otherwise have
existed ? We must answer this question in the negative. There
is no claim that he participated in, or was ever present at the time
of making the contract of hire; nor that he had any authority to
modify that contract or make a new one. The case is quite similar
in principle to Crocker v. Gullifer, 44 Me. 491, where one of the
drivers had a conditional interest in the horses and consented to
the diversion; but it was held, the defendants were liable for their
value, notwithstanding they were accidentally destroyed by fire
without the neglect or fault of any one.
The judgment of the Circuit Court affirmed.
Bailments for hire embrace a variety
of contracts growing out of the delivery
of personal property on an agreement
mutually beneficial to the contracting
parties. The contract includes hire of
things, hire of storage, hire of labor and
services and hire of carriage : 2 Kent's
Com. 586; Cowen's Trea. 66. But
it will be necessary to confine this note to
the hire of things.
Interest of the Bailee in thing hired.-
It is an undisputed rule that the hirer of
goods and chattels for use, acquires in
them during the term of his contract, a
possessory right. He purchases them for
the purpose or time mentioned in the con-
tract, and during that time becomes the
proprietor of them. In Putnam v. Wley,
8 Johns. 432, the plaintiff let some cows
and sheep for one year, to be returned
at the end of that time with their natural
increase ; the court held the bailor could
not maintain trespass against one taking
goods from the possession of the bailee
during the term of the'contract, not hav-
ing actual or constructive possession at
the time. And the court further say,
that to maintain trespass he should have
such a right in the chattels as to be enti-
tled to reduce them to possession at any
time, but that the hirer had the possession
of the chattels for a year. So, also,
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nuon ti , uml pril-ile -lie hirer li y
ntailii-is . tci,,i , not onli against third
ptrzoll-, I1it ... tlust tlle owner Ilhinstlf,
if lie init t ies \i ith the chattel before
the baihintnt expires: lieol v. Buik,
2.- "'t. 149 ; Wood v. AsL, Owen 139;
1lam. IN. 1. 249 ; Robcrts v. lhyatt, 2
TaLunt. 26.
The ea-l of iubcilsv. llatt arote out
o| the deliviry of an abstract for the
Irpose (if learing up sonm portions of
the title. lefendant refused to redeliver,
and plaintiff brought trover, and the
court ield the pilaintiff had a temporary
iutervt in the abstract, which could not
be deternitlld until it was decided
N% lit ther the should go oit or nt,
and, therefoie, lie was entitled to the
pos-esioln until such time. A creditor
of the bailor fIas no right to take pos-
session of the chattel during the term of
baifinent : llurt brd v. Jackson, It N. 11.
145. There the property was taken
from the possession of the bailee by a
(ielitor of tie bailor. The latter sued
the fintr for rent, atd it was held
the attat hitnt by the iailor's creditor
% .t1- no dtletlve ii li action for rent, but
the coutrt intimated the bailee might
nltaititain an action againbt tile oficer
%. flu nale the le v, or the attaching
creditor Lilntls If, fur alty iniury whil
aightl re-uilh fruti sucll suizirc. Trover
or c eplc in cannot be maintained by a
biifir agait.-t one wieto 4n0, ert property
failed ; for. althbough lie has a reversion-
ary interest therein, Ike has neither the
possession or right of possession : Gordon
v. larper, 7 T. I. 9 ; IVheeler v. Train,
a Pick. 255.
It nmay be asked what rule may be
applied to distinguih a baihnent from
alt actual s:ale of tile property ? It is said
in Lontygai v. ,S cwurt, 55 Ill. 45, that
where the thing delivered is tobe restored,
though in an altered form, the contract
is one of bailintnt, and the title to the
property i6 not changed ; but where
there i Ito obligatiotn to return the spe-
cific artiele, and the chattel may be re-
stored by anther of equal value, tile
title is changed, and it amounts to a sale.
To samte effect : Story Baihn. sect. 439 ;
Bard v. list, 7 Cow. 752 ; Eiv-my v.
'rinch, I Black. 353; CIuse v. lI'ash-
barn, 1 Ohio St. 244 ; .Norton v. 1Irood-
rn;; 2 Conist. 153; lesilly v. 1Wilson,
3 Dill. 420 ; (otra, " ynoiir V. Vroi'n,
19 Johns. 44. See as to a contract fir
sale or return: ,Mhsisger V. 6Strllon,
9 It. I. 578. Where, by a contract, a
person receives a chattel to keep for a
certain time, and to become the owner
of it when lie has paid tie contract
price, but if not, to pay for its use, it is
a bailtiett atid does not amount to a sale
until tile price is paid : Eaoi V. Klein,
79 Penn. St. 488 ; Ilose v. 5tory, 1 Id.
190 ; Clark v. Juck, 7 Watts 375. See
Bicker v. Snith, 59 I'enn. St. 469
Myers v. 11arrey, 2 P. & W. 479. The
di-tntion between a bailent and a
sale is well elucidated in unt v. 1 bjniun,
100 Mass. 199, %%here the deletdant ex-
pressed a x isli to try the horse islhich
plaintiff had for .ale, and if lie did not
like it would return it I Ithe niglt of the
day when lie got it." Plaintiflassented,
and delivered the horse to defendant's
servant, 1,10t1m whoiit it escaped, %xitiout
Ili., faitt, and wa- so ilijured that defend-
ant haul no opl t-tunity to try it, anti,
consequently, did nt return it within
the time agreed. llaintifft -ued for the
price, and on the trial te-tifid lie did not
expect defendant to take the horse until
he had tried it. The court held this evi-
dence showed a bailment but no sale.
Says AVELLS, J. : ".An option to pur-
chase if lie liked is essentially different
from an option to return a purchase if he
should not like. In one case, tte title
will not pass until the option is deter-
mined ; in the other, the property passes
at once, suhjeet t tlle right to rescind
and return. A mere failure to return
the horse within the time agreed may lie
a breach of* contract, upon which the
plaintiff is entitled to an appropriate
remedy ; but has no such legal etli:et as
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to convert the bailment into a sale."
See 6 Am. Law Rev. 450; Bulldey v.'
Andrews, 39 Conn. 70; Morss v. Stone,
5 Barb. 516; Ledyard v. Hibbard, 48
Mich. 421 ; Powder Co. v. .Burkhardt,
97 U. S. 110; and Carpenter v. Grffin,
9 Paige Ct. 310, where the agreement
was to return "cattle as good,"I at the
end of the term, and it was held a sale.
See also Lewis v. XcCabe, 21 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 217, and note.
As to Bailee's use of the thing hired.-
The lessor of a chattel is bound to furnish
an article suitable for the purpose of the
bailment, on the ground that the hirer
must trust to the lessor's knowledge of
the qualities of the chattel, like the pur-
chaser under an implied warranty: Lord
A BINGER, in Sutton v. Temple, 12 M. &
W. 52 ; Fowler v. Lock, L. R., 7 C. P.
272. On the other hand, there is a cor-
responding implied obligation on the part
of the hirer to use the chattel in a reason-
able manner: Robinson v. Parnell, 16
Tex. 382 ; Latimer v. Alexander, 14 Ga.
260. The departure in an unreasonable
way in the use of the chattel, brings
down upon the bailce a strict liability to
the bailor for all damages the latter has
suffered; and in the case of Wentworth
v. McDuffle, 48 N. H. 402, the court
went so far as to say: "If the bailer
had seen his mare was about to be de-
stroyed by the bailee's wilful act, he
would have been entitled to terminate
the bailment, and retake his property if
he could do it without force.". The
bailee, in that case, wilfully and inten-
tionally drove the mare at such a violent
rate of speed as to seriously endanger
her life, he being aware of such danger.
See Story Bailm., sect. 396. The bailee
also impliedly agrees not to apply the
property bailed to any other use than for
which it is hired. A familiar illustration
of this rule is, if one hire a carriage and
horses to go to Boston, he has no right
to go upon a journey to New York; or,
if he hire them for i week he has no rizht
to use them for a month: Story Bailm.,
sect. 413; Rotch v. Hawes, Homer v.
Thwing, Wheelock v. Wheelwright, cited
in principal case.
The contract may specify the use to
which the chattel is to be put, and under
such circumstances, if the hirer use it in
a way not authorized by the contract, he
is guilty of conversion, and if a loss
results, he is .liable, independent of the
question of negligence. He cannot ex-
cuse his failure to return it by showing it
was lost while being used contrary to the
terms of the contract: Hooks v. Smith,
18 Ala. 338 ; Beach v. Raritan, 4ec., Rd.
Co., 37 N. Y. 457. The case of Beach
v. Raritan, 4-c., was a case where a
barge, while being used for a different
purpose than that for which the parties
had contracted, was sunk. It was held
the bailee was liable. In Hooks v. Smith,
a slave was bailed to do housework, and
was put by bailee at work in the field,
and while engaged in such work was
drowned. Held, the loss must fall on
bailee. Where the hiring is for a certain
purpose, it is considered a part of the
contract. The purpose for which a thing
is hired may or may not enter into the
contract. Where the contract of hiring
is general, the bailee acquires the right
to use the chattel generally, but not to
employ it in any dangerous business:
Spencer v. Pilcher, 8 Leigh 565. But
in Harvey v. Epes, 12 Gratt. 176, it was
held the incidental mention of a place
where the thing is to be used, may not
create an agreement on the bailee to
use the chattel in such place, and that a
use of slaves in a different place from
that mentioned in the contract is not of
itself a conversion, and that the burden
of proof is on the hirer, to show that the
loss did not result from the employment
in a different place.
Such misuser is deemed a conversion
of the property at common law, for
which the bailee maybe held t6 the full
extent of the loss : Story Bailm., sect.
413. But it seems that any misuse in
the line of the use for which the thing is
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bailed, will not amount to a conversion.
Sucl. a doctrine was indicated by RED-
PIE1.ti, J., in :itlt v. .osel-y, 10 Vt.
29S, where lie sais: "Any nisuse or
abuse of the thing bailed, in the particular
use for which the bailineut was made,
will not enable the general owner to
maintain trcspass or trover against the
bailee. His remedy is case. Batif the
thing be put to a drit'ertnt use from that
for which it was bailed, by the consent
of the bailee, we think the bailor may
maintain trespass or trover." His re-
marks, however, are not applicable to
the facts in that ease. There the bailor
brought trover for the property, claiming
the bailee had sold it during the term of
the bailent. Moxcun, J., in an ex-
haustive opinion in ]harvey v. Epes,
supra, is inclined to tie opinion that
unless the injury or loss re-alt fioti the
misuser, no action will lie. 11 The use,"
be says, "of the property by the hirer
during the term, for a different purpose
or in a ditfleient manner froi that which
was intended by tie parties, will not
anioat to a conversion, for which trover
will lie, unless the destruction of tile
property be thereby occasioned ; or, at
least, unless the act be (tore with intent
to convert tile property, and thtus to de-
feat or dtetroy the initercst of the bailor
therein."
If the hailee niuse or abuse the
propc-rty, the o,,ntr cannot justify a
seizure of it by torce fr in the personal
possession (if the ,ailce, if lie can peace-
ably retake it. The hirer of a horse
who has wrongfully used him to go upon
a diffierent journey from that contracetd
for, cannot be dragged from the horse
while lie is riling him : Story Bailm.,
sect. 396.
Such misuser amounts to a termination
of the aihineut, anti destrovs tlie.liirer's
special property therein ; and if the
owner could take tile chattel peaceably,
and did so, he would be ji-titied in
reft.in, to returti it to the hailce, if lie
believr .1 tLe ill-treatment vtotld be con-
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tinned: Trottir v. McOall, 26 Iliss.
413.
Where tie clattel is used in violation
of the contract, the bailor, by receiving
pay for the unauthorized use, ratifies the
wrongful act and cannot afterwards
bring trover : Rotch v. 1law, s, supra;
but will not waive his right of action by
receiving back the property : bx v.
Prudcn, 3 Daly 187 ; Baillor's N. P.
46. See Rcqnolds v. Shuder. 5 Cow.
323; Livermore v. Northrq, 44 N. Y.
107 ; Austin v. Miller, 74 N. C. 274.
The attempt to sell or otherwise trals-
fer the chattel without the owner's con-
sent during tie term of hiring, is such a
conversion by the bailee as will make
him liable in trover : Loesclanan v.
Machin, 3 Eng. C. L. 359, decided in
1818, is a leading Englislh case upon
this point. This was followed by Cooper
v. l"illomatt, 50 Id. 672 ; I3rqrpnt v.
WMtrdell, 2 Ex. 478 ; and Raut v. Bit-
th.ston, 7 Exeh. 152. Tile doctrine
enunciated in these caie,; seems to rest
upon the ground that the sale of pro-
perty by a bailee is equivalent to its
destruction. -o fiut as Iis liability is con-
cerned. So, in this country, tie weight
of authority seems to be that tie hailce
will be liable, or an action u'ill lie
against the purchaser if lie fail- to return
the property to the bailor on demand :
Swift v. .MIrh, , ss,ta ; Saryt lit v. f;le,
8 X. II. 325 ; Sait,,ra v. Colnan, 6 Id.
14 ; Btiley v. Co'lty, 34 Ill. 29 ; .J,din-
son v. 17iileij. 46 Id. 75 ; Clark v. .ack,
7 Watts 375 ; Rodyers v. ;rothe, 58
Penn. St. 414. Bit the rule Iha. not
been followed in -North Carolina: An-
drews v. Shtw, 4 ])ev. 70: Ltwis v.
Mobley, 4 Dec. & B. 323. In Andrews
v. Slaiw, the bailee of a slave for a year
sold it and the owner brought trover
during the year. Ilurrix, C. J., said,
in reference to L,., ,i',nt v. Mackin
" If it is meant in that ca-s to say that a
bailee upon hire for a determin:te period
forfeits his interest by altu- to the arti-
cle, or by a wrongful -ale, so that a pur-
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chaser from him gets nothing, I think itis
not law. I do not know of any such doc-
trine of forfeiture as applied to personal
chattels." See Harvey v. Epes, supra, for
a minute examination of all these cases.
The use of chattels is sometimes hired
where there is no actual bailment, as
where the owner or his servant accom-
panies the chattels and works with them:
Carter v. Streator, 4 Jones L. 62 ;
Hughes v. Boyer, 9 Watts 556. The
contract then becomes special, and the
bailor is answerable for the conduct of
his servant. In Hughes v. Boyer,
the owner of the horses sent a servant
along to drive and take care of them.
They were injured by immoderate driv-
ing, and the owner sought to hold the
hirer, but the court said no. "If a
horse is hired to me, and I am to ride or
drive him, I am to judge of what dis-
tance he can travel in a given time, and
to see that he is not overheated or too
much fatigued. But if, as often happens,
the owner himself goes along and drives,
I have no care of the horse, and no re-
sponsibility if he is injured. But if the
owner sends a driver, who is to drive,
and water and feed the horses, it is as to
me the same as if the owner himself
drove. If his driver oversets and breaks
my arm, his master is liable to me ; and
if, at the same time, the carriage is
broken, I am not liable to the owner; it
was not done by me, but by himself or his
servant. But a horse may be hurt at the
same time; I am not liable for that ; it was
the result of the carelessness or unskil-
fulness of the owner or his servant. And
whenever the owner sends a servant to
drive and take care of the horses, be who
is carried has no responsiiblity, unless
the injury occurred from some act or
interference of his." But the hirer in
such cases may become liable to the full
extent of a bailee, by making the driver
his own servant or assuming the actual
management of the chattels. Thus, in
Murphy v. Kaufman, 20 La. Ann. 559,
the hirer was held for a loss of the
horses, where it appeared that he pre-
vailed upon the driver to go to a place
beyond the place agreed upon, and the
horses were lost as a result. As to the
measure of care required, there is a differ-
ence between a gratuitous bailee and one
for hire. The former is bound to extra-
ordinary care, and is responsible if his
negligence resulted in slight injuries to
the chattel : Bennett v. O'Brien, 37
Ill. 250; Scranton v. Baxter, 4 Sand.
5 ; see Carrington v. Ficklin, 32 Gratt.
670; Patterson v. Mclver, 90 N. C.
493. But if no carelessness can be im-
puted to him, and he pursues the line of
his duty, an injury to the chattel must
be borne by the owner: Wood v. McClure,
7 Ind. 155 ; Fortune v. Harris, 6 Jones
532-; Carpenter v. Branch, 13 Vt. 161.
But-with a hirer of a chattel the rule is
otherwise. The contract is then mutu-
ally beneficial, and the bailee can only
be held liable for ordinary negligence,
unless he departs from the terms of his
contract. Inevitable accident or superior
force will excuse him from returning the
chattel in as good condition as it came to
him: Vaughan v. Webster, 5 Harr. 256 ;
Millon v. Salisbury, 13 Johns. 211 ;
Columbus v. Howard, 6 Ga. 213 ; Field
v. Brackett, 56 Me. 121 ; Watkins v.
Roberts, 28 Ind. 167 ; Hyland v. Paul,
33 Barb. 241. Story deduces the rule
from his investigation of the authorities,
that the hirer of chattels can only be held
responsible for that degree of diligence
which all prudent men use, that is, which
men in general use in keeping goods of
their own of the same kind. In other
words, he can only be held for such in-
juries as come from an omission of that
diligence: StoryBailm.,sect. 399. Buis
v. Cook, 60 Mo. 391.
In cases of robbery or loss by public
enemies, the hirer is not answerable for
the loss unless it has been occasioned by
his own fault: Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld.
Ray. 909 ; Story Bailm. sect. 526 ; U.
S. v. Thomas, 15 Wall. 337 ; and see
State v. Moore, 74 Mo. 414.
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- i ' - ix:. - r I .ike niy .oinra'r
l it-, . t" :fi t ,r.linary e;:rv or
- £. - I.c ,a v.. lRraz,:i. 56 Me. 12-I.
f. ,'.n',f J"-,;- - :i- ,;ir ,1mra rule
Ilt I 
I  
;iriy ;ifl'l.-.i ra irrl-t, irotve
it. i.,ih Itluw'e that if the bilor of a
t-attel allege a- losz- or injure to iuh he
niaut- prove that it was caused br the
baiicc' ne.ligene. 1'rofl- o+- or in-
111:; ii0 hin the ha-ts oif tile b.ilec is
not sniciut : Irrr..qb-v. .' .kyr, 3
Barlr. .38o0; .2uIon v. Pope1, I Cow.
109. Thuie were both cases of an injury
to a horce bv carelessness. See also
Runra Y. 61,hrift. 7 Hump~h. 131;i
B,' 'n v. .,T/, aso,, 29 Tex. 43. The
application of tie rules concering the
buriheir f proof int ra-es of negligence,
are no; always clearly stated; but iin
general it may be said that where the
property bailed is returned h a damaged
state, or uot :tI all, the baihe i.i:,i;r to
exculpate himsetlf, ail a 111 T Ilay weit
all fie cvhthtice tha-' snlniin-,l : ( ,llis
v. U.,, l. 4a N. Y. .420 .11 hu ,I- V.
1,,;,., 2(; Vt. 34(1- L.*:;,tzrv- Jbit,, tv,;,
6 Penin. Kt- 417 ; Fi'rlm ve Ah uidc ,
21+ T,'x. 1-iS;. 4o4-1 ;,w i. 1.1,-r'. 3
2",rmbn: i ,Y" ti. L.tatmu.- This
Ivay be by<,Ll'.l in 'vcrub i., -
tic aiit 1 'l.-hnit" of Whe -Xrl- , the
baihaem. If-e dclru-ttiu oL 1-1-, ;,rqpert'r
be itle.tablh, ea:-inlllty, bTy 1nut ,-*,t,-e'nt"
of the parti.-, bv ,livr.thI ol- ]1W, .s
Ih l lhvi c ti e otmda:-", thikiU;
hired - Sior IBailin.: s-er. 4 1$ -. I *ii,Ilt-
v. Mh il,. 3 C. & 1 . 542 iId/fcd v.
]Declahdin, 29 31o. 459 ; ,od '. Gle,
$ntr- If the term of" hiriing is tixc'l, the
bailec shotilu return it at that tinic, but
if Ii tia is fixel the ha a.-umes a
rea-oiiabltl tnle : Grit ca. II,, Syswrv,*1.
suittC, hl, v. Iatuh/,' 5 t'al. 539.
But zr gratuitous bailnicnt t.iy le termi-
Ilateil at the bailor+'s plval-tr. : Or:er V.
ZS"orma,- 9- Cow. 687 ; DrkIv v. Rcd,,q-
toj 9 N- IL 243. The gctnra1 rule
require4 the baitve to return the thing
hired on the deterniiatiu of tle Con-
tract: I;rqie v. Cv,,r!, 21 Ala. 151.
And from the- v "r ehiunelt, of his coil-
irct, if he Ihils to llier it to the right-
fill on y it, lie t:- gtil y .&a It llveriolt -
& eph, nst v. la, 4 Iu-4-. 6 ; D,r,-
r ., v. B rchtj, 2 B - irn. ,& A.. 702
CTqll' v. Ijemlon, .Rd. , 7 Al-ti 341.
A. G. MEKRixis.
Detroit, 3lib..
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"Where vendors rescind a s.le on the groun of fraud, anl bring replevin undler
which a porti,, of' the good- is seized and returml, thiey tatiiiot recover tor tie
lrah.nce aiihl-: tile a--iined ttltc Of th;t veile upon ;h claim for goud- zshl and
deli' ed, but nm-t bring all action on the tort.
CA-MITnut L. C. J., atitldl tEWOoD, J.) dis-Ceed.
Eizi:oit to Cass.
ira -1.t h. tcelr and Georje 1]. IT'a,iy, for plaintif, and
aplvel lant.
RL].. -', f- C t 'r. fvr defendant.
FARWELL v. MYERS.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MORSE, J.-Between August 7th and December 10th 1883, the
defendant, who was then engaged in the mercantile business at
Cassopolis, Michigan, bought of plaintiffs several bills of goods,
amounting in the aggregate to $10,396.69, and paid on account
$896.14. On January 4th 1884, defendant made a general assign-
ment for the benefit of his creditors to one Henry W. Smith. This
assignment is admitted to be valid, and this suit is in recognition
of the same. On the eighth day of January 1884, the plaintiffs
brought replevin in Circuit Court of United States for Western
District of Michigan, for all the goods sold by them to Myers, as
hereinbefore mentioned, and their writ of.replevin mentioned and
described, and commanded the marshal to take and .deliver to the
plaintiffs each and all the articles sold by them to him, as aforesaid.
On this writ the marshal took and delivered to the plaintiffs goods
therein mentioned, valued and .appraised at $3420, but which had
been charged to defendant in said account at $4104, and this latter
sum made a part of the said $9500.55. The goods so taken by the
marshal were such as he found in the store, and were parts of all
the different bills purchased, and he returned that he was unable to
find the other goods in said writ mentioned. The plaintiffs grounded
their replevin suit upon the claim that Myers did not intend to pay
for the goods when he bought them, and that they had, before they
brought their suit in replevin, elected to rescind the sale to him in
consequence of his fraud, and gave notice of such election to the
assignee before this writ of replevin issued. The replevin suit was
tried upon this theory, the evidence sustained it, and the plaintiffs
had judgment on the twelfth day of December 1884. On the
fifteenth day of December 1884, the plaintiffs filed their claim in
the cerk's office of Cass county, attached to which was a statement
of their account. Plaintiffs filed their claim, basing it upon said
account as for goods sold and delivered, stating that the consideration
was for merchandise, and that the debt was contracted at the dates
the go-ds were delivered, and made no mention of. the suit in
replevin, or the judgment therein, crediting the defendant, how-
ever, with $226T.15, as of March 20th 1884, being, presumably,
their estimation of the value of the goods recovered under their
action of replevin.
These facts appeared by stipulation, and also that on the 26th of
December 1884, there was still in the hands of the assignee about
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$1510. beis some collectible accounts and ntes, part of which
were not yet due. all of which still remained in the hanids of the
assignee: that tie proof of claim should be considered as comply-
ing with the requirements of the statute, and the credit item of
$2267.15 should be considered as $4104, leaving balance against
the insolvent's estate of $5396.55, and all formal defects in said
proof of claim were waived. On the 13th of May 1884, thirty-nine
other creditors had proven claims against said estate, aggregating
$15,368.67, and tile assignee, after due notice, had declared and
paid to them a dividend of 20 per cent. before the filing of plain-
tiffs' claim. The assignee gave all the notices required by law, of
the assignment, and of proof of claims prior to January 15th 1884,
and filed proof thereof as required by law, and the plaintiffs had
all the statutory notices required by law prior to that date. On
the 23d day of December 1884, the assignee gave notice that the
claim of plaintiffs, as filed, would be contested, and the same was
thereupon duly entered on the law side of the court as a cause in
the name of said plaintiffs as against said defendant, and *a trial
was had of the same. under the statute, before the court without a
jury. The circuit judge found, as a matter of law, upon the facts
above stated, that the claim of plaintiffs could not be sustained, and
entered judgment disallowing the same.
It is urged here that, under the facts, the plaintiffs are entitled
to recovvr. We do not think so. Early in the proceedings,
immediately after the assignment. the plaintiff- elected to rvczvin'l
the sale of the goods, and brought replevin for the same on the
theory that the fraud of the defendant hall vitiated tile sale, and
that the gool , belonged to them as if no sale had ever been made.
After thus solemnly electing their remedy, and proceeding, through
a trial to judgment, upon the theory that they owned the goods,
because they failed to get adequate relief in such suit, they cannot
be allowed, a year afterwards, to come into court, and base a claim
upon the inconsistent idea that the goods were sold to defendant.
One theory is totally at variance with the other. If one elects
between two inconsistent remedies, the right to pursue the other is
for ever lost : T.,mpson. v. Jfoward, 31 Mich. 319 ; We'etmore v.
1keD,,qmll. 32 Id. 276 ; Dunks v. Fuller, Id. .43 ;.X5ild v. Bur-
ton. 49 I,1. 5:3.
We do not leny the right of plaintiffs to collect the balance, the
value of the goods not recovered by his action in replevin, in a pru-
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per action for the conversion of the same; but he cannot do so upon
the claim filed with the assignee, counting upon the original con-
tract for goods sold and delivered. If he should elect to waive the
tort, and sue in assump it, he would yet have to declare specially
averring the tort: Tregent v. Maybee, 54 Mich. 226.
The judgment of the court below must be affirmed, with costs.
CHAMPLIN, J., concurred.
CAMPBELL, C. J., (dissenting).-I am unable to concur in the
view that plaintiffs, by replevying a part of the goods which were
fraudulently obtained from them by defendant, thereby lost their
right to pursue him for the balance by an action of assumpsit. The
right which a defrauded vendor has to reclaim goods fraudulently
obtained by the purchaser is not, in any just sense, an absolute
ending of their relations. The case before us in no way differs from
that where a vendor enforces a right of stoppage in transitu, which
does not always secure all the goods sold. In such a case the law
is now clear that the effect of the reclaiming of a part of the goods
is not to destroy the vendor's right to sue for the value of the
remainder. It is more a matter of words than of substance, to hold
that in such a case there is no interference with the contract itself;
for, practically, a sale is very seriously interfered with by any
retention or reclamation of the goods sold. Neither is it very
important to inquire on what particular theory the plaintiffs' rights
are insisted on. There can be no doubt that if the contract is con-
sidered as rescinded, the goods not replevied and disposed of by
defendant must be accounted for in some way. Whether treated as
sold or as tortiously converted, the plaintiffs, according to well-
settled rules, could always sue in assumpsit for the proceeds or value,
and could do so under the common counts or specially. The
demand for these moneys is not one for damages- at large, as for a
wrong, but is a pecuniary claim based on fixed rules of recovery.
I do not think there is anything in our statutes, or in bankruptcy
proceedings anywhere, which would prevent the proof of any such
claim for which implied assumpsit lies; and it seems to me that any
rule which cuts off such a redreds would be in .furtherance of the
vendee's fraud. In Powers v. Benedict, 88 N. Y. 605, the doctrine
was recognised that a 1partial recovery of goods, under such circum-
stances, did not bar an action for the remainder. We held, our-
selves, in Dayton v. Monroe, 47 Mich. 193, that a person suing
4] 7 ... .
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for fraud was not bound to return a note which was given for the
consideration as a condition of suing. And it seems to me that no
doctrine can be sound which puts a person to a complete election at
his peril, and bars him from any adequate remedy against the
wrongdoer. Our statute concerning claims does not cut off any
claim which can be regarded as an obligation of the assigning
debtor, and the right to a judgment and relief is the same as if
there had been no assignment. In a case of this kind no mere
technicality should stand in the way of justice. That defendant is
responsible for the unrecovered goods is beyond dispute. Being so,
I think there should be a recovery as claimed, and that the judg-
ment should be reversed, and a new trial granted.
SHERWOOD. J., concurred.
It is a general priniple, that fraud
renders a sale of chattels voidable; but
what acts upon the part of the vendee,
or circumstances connected with his finan-
cial standing will have this effect, is a
question in dispute.
It is very generally held that fradn-
lent representations or the active sup-
prcs ion of in-olvency o r the purpose of
obtainh g a ttllse credit. wvill make a sale
voidable at the option of the vendor:
Cross v. Patrs, 1 Me. 376 ; Rliayfon v.
Robcrts, 25 Vt. 6E6 ; .11,,ril. v. 1lacd-
71a(n 42 Cotl. :!9 ; Lu,hi v. Mar , 6
Wend. 81 ; B .y v. .,t Lor, 21 D arb.
585; 1l74hr v. ( ,.Yrn, 3 E. 1). Smith
199 Xichoi., v. lJinne,. 18 N. Y. 293;
D-roe v. I3rawdt. 53 14. 462 ; O'R',erv.
,irmyf, 13 111. 658 ; IA,welI v. Bradlee,
9 G. & J. (Md.) 220: Cbnyers v. Ennis,
2 Nlason 236 ; GarLult v. Bank, 22
Wis. 384 ; 3iggs v. Burry, 2 Curtis C.
C. 259 ; Cross v. Peters, I Greenl. 376
Tio.ipson v. Rose, 16 Conn. 71.
It is .utlicient that the fraudulent rep-
resentatios are nmade by a third person
to whom the venlee refers the vendor:
1itzsinmnos v. .Joslin, -1 Vt. 129.
Such representations ditfer from a war-
ranty in that they mua be made at any
time prcious to the contract of sale:
Seaver v. Dinghy, 4 Greenl. 306. And
fraud may be evidenced by transactions
with others about the same time : St ic-
art v. Emerson, 52 XN. 11. 301 ; Dradhy
v. Obear, 10 Id. 477; ll'iqg. v. Dy,
9 Gray 97 ; "iowhr v. B36dow, 12 Pick.
316 ; Cary v. flotailing, 1 Hill 311
1.1oal uhl v. Xabqror, 24 N. Y. 139.
A lreconceivol design not to pay tbr
g(;od- is Nuffieicnt, by the great wevcalit
of authority, to make a sah ,,id,ble:
),,,#'d v. 1"Tehr, 41 Con. 203: .lqnch
v. Liechr, 3S Id. 493; l lPi:.ia v. Day,
9 Gray 97 ; D.,,c v. Sanb,,'n, 3 Allen
181 ; Dairdi v. H1d, q, I Pa.e 4 2 ; AsL
v. Pnnm, I l!i'l 302; 1". .rd v.
(Compho, l 65 Dlar!). 286; %;" . ll(b-
ster, 46 Mo. 181; Irr;q v. i1 1,ly, 7
Ding. 543; s. c. 5 loo:e & 1P. 3,0.
But a contrary rule p.revail i l'einvl-
vania, where it is held 
"
that tl,,.re must
be artifice intended and fitted to deceive
practised upon the vendor : Smith v.
Murphy, 21 Penn. St. 367 : Dwkentoss v.
,S1dc ehr, 31 Id 324 ; I'ottiany-r v. eck-
sh-e, 2 Gr. 309.
The mere fiet that the vendee is insol-
vent, and knew himelf to he so at the
time of the sale, while evid ece of a
fraudulent iunent. is not of itseif suffi-
cient to avoid tl:e de: Redilnnl V.
Rotcrt, _' Vt. 68r; ; lmto v. Comp-
bd, 70- IlL 72 ; Kiwj, v. 1" dlips, 8
Bosw. 603 ,tir-t list -f a w, tte.
But in Mitchell v. 1,,rui,,. 20 Barb.
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253, it ws held, that where there had
been a series of transactions between"
vendor and vendee, extending over a
length of time, and giving rise to a trust
and confidence, that an open act of
bankruptcy upon the part of the vendee
unknown to the vendor at the time of
sale, would render it voidable.
As fraud renders a sale voidable and
not void, bona fide purchasers, mortga-
gees and pledgees are protected in any
rights in the chattels acquired from the
vendee, previous to the vendor's electing
to rescind the sale: 0. 6- M. By. Co. v.
Kerr, 49 Ill. 458; Williamson v. Rus-
sell, 39 Conn. 412 ; Dow v. Sanborn, 3
Allen 181; HBofmanv. Noble, 6 Met. 68;
Parker v. Patrick, 5 T. R. 175; Benj.
Sales, 433. 3d ed.; Story Sales, 446, a;
Schouler's Pers. Prop. 638. But in
Hartt v. McNeil, 47 Mo. 526, it was
held that a bona fide pledge's interest is
not protected.
Attaching and execution creditors of
the vendee acquire no greater rights than
their debter: Sc&hweizer v. Tracy, 76
Ill. 345 ; Hawes v. Dingley, 17 Me. 341 ;
Jordan v. Parker, 56 Id. 557 ; Durell v.
Haley, 1 Paige 492 ; Ash v. Putnam, I
Hill 302; Mowrey v. Walsh, 8 Cow.
238 ; Hitchcockv. Covill, 20 Wend. 167 ;
Wiqgin v. Day, 9 Gray 97 ; Bussing v.
Rice, 2 Cush. 48 ; Buffington v. Gerrish,
15. Mass. 156. And it has been said
that such is the case though the debt
sought to be recovered, is one incurred
subsequent to the sale, and upon credit
of the goods: Feld v. Stearns, 42 Vt.
111 ; but this proposition is disputed :
(Tilbert v. Hudson, 4 Greel. 345 : Brad-
ley v. Obear, 10 N. H. 477; Thompson
v. B~ose, 16 Conn. 71.
Where goods fraudulently obtained
are sold in satisfaction of a pro-existing
debt, the second vendee's rights in the
property are subject to those of the
original vendor : Barnard v. Campbell,
58 N. Y. 73; Root v.F rench, 13 Wend.
570; Lupin v. Marie, 2 Paige 170;
Jackson v. Myers, 11 Wend. 533 ; Poor
v. W'oodburn, 25 Vt. 234;, Lynch v
Beecher, 38 Conn. 490; McLeod v.
Bank, 42 Miss. 99 ; Johnson v. Peck,
1 Wood. & Min.,C. C. 334. But see
contra, Waggoner v. Cooley, 17 I1. 239 ;
Lee v. Kimball, 45 Me. 172 ; Gibson v.
Moore, 7 B. Mon. 92 ; Titcomb v. Wood,
38 Me. 561 ; State v. Schulein, 45 Mo.
521 ; Abbott v. Barrg, 5 Moore 98.
A third party obtaining goods with
knowledge of the fraud, is not protected :
Phelps v. Conant, 30 Vt. 277 ; Allison
v. Matthieu, 3 Johns. 236; Hyde v.
Ellery, 18 Md. 496; Biddle v. Levy, 1
Stark. 20; Qill v. Perrott, 3 Taunt.
274; 1 Chit. P1. 100; and the burden
of proof is on the party claiming bona
fides: Devoe v. Brandt, 53 N. Y. 462.
A: re-purchase from a bona fide pur-
chaser remits the fraudulent vendee to
his original position ; Schutt v. Large, 6
Barb. 380.
Upon discovery of fraud, the vendor
has an election to affirm or rescind the
sale. He may waive the tort and stie in
assumpsit: McCullough v. McCullough,
14 Penn. St. 295 ; Butts v. Collins, 13
Wend. 154; Berly v. Taylor, 5 Hill
577; Hinds v. Tweddle, 7 How. (N.
Y.) 278; Ketletas v. Fleet, 7 Johns.
324; Gray v. Griffith, 10 Watts 431 ;
Sanders v. Hamilton, 3 Dana 552 ; Pat-
terson v. Prior, 18 Ind. 440 ; Jones v.
Gregg, 17 Id. 84; .Tohnson v. Reed, 3
Eng. 202 ; 0' Conley v. Natchez, 1 Sm.
& M1 31 ; Foster v. Stewart, 3 M. & S.
191 ; Gill v. Kyner, 5 Moore 525. The
weight of authority seems to favor the
doctrine, that, if he adopts this course,
he must wait till the expiration of any
credit given : I Chit. P1. 107 ; Dellone
v. Hull, 47 Md. 112 ; Feruson v. Car-
rington, 9 B. & C. 59. In Strutt v.
Smith, I C., Al. & 3R. 411, the court say,
"I It is clear that the plaintiffs cannot
avail themselves of the defendant's fraud,
so as to rescind the contract, and substi-
tute a new contract of sale on different
terms."
Other courts permit assumpsit to be
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brought before the expiration of the
credit : 11ann v. Ston'dl, 3 Chand.
(Wis.) 243; Hogan v. Slice, 2 Esp.
522 ; De Symons v. Mnbrhwich, 1 Id.
430. So in Wigand v. S;cl, 3 Keyes
(N. Y. Ct. App.) 120, it is said that
"It is not accurate to say that the
plaintiffis sought to avoid the contract of
sale. It is the credit only, that is sought
to be avoided." Tite doctrine of this
decision is criticised and rejected in Kel-
logg v. Turpie, 93 Ill. 269.
Where the latter rule prevails, assump-
sit would probably lie in all cases, though
the goods had not been converted to
money : Roth v. Pabir, 27 Barb. 652 ;
Putnam v. Wise, 1 Hill 234 ; Chamnbrs
v. Lewis, 2 Hilt. 591 ; Niqnet v. Allison,
12 Mich. 328; Stocl:ett v. Watkins, 2
Gill & Johns. 326.
It is a general rule, however, that
goods fraudulently obtained, must have
bccn converted to money before assump-
sit lies : Emerson v. Me.,Vamara, 41 Me.
565; Sinith v. Smith, 43 N. II. 536;
Plelps v. Conant, 30 Vt. 2777 ; IVinclell
v. Xo~ijs, 23 Id. 303 ; Gilmore v. Wilbur,
12 Pick. 120 ; Jones v. Hoar, 5 Id. 285 ;
O'Reer v. .9ronq, 13 II. 688 ; 3forrison
v. Rogers. 2 Scan. 317 ; ll'lht v. 1171-
left, 3 Watts 277 ; Schn'eizer v. 11eItmr,
6 Rich. (S. C.) 159 ; lutchinson v.
Phillips, 6 Eng. 270; Lindon v. Iooper,
Cowp. 419. If the vendor elect to
rescind the sale, replevin will lie for the
goods or trover for their value : Brown
v. Pierce, 97 Mass. 49 ; Kline v. Baker,
99 Mass. 255 ; ,Seaver v. Dingley, 4
Greenl. 306 ; Prentiss v. Russ, 16 Me.
60 ; Darrell v. Haley, 1 Paige 492;
Noble v. Adams, 7 Taunt. 59.
It has been held that the vendor may
retake the property by stratagem : Earl
Bristol v. Wilsmore, 2 Dowl. & Ryl.
755. Or by the use of necessary
orce: Hodgelen v. Iubbard, 18 Vt.
504; Patrick v. Colerick, 3 M. &'W.
4q3.
A carrier who has been induced to
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part with chattels by fraudulent repro
sentations may replevy them; Bigehots
v. leaton, 6 Hill 44.
The evidence of fraud to justify a
rescission must he clear : Ilenshaw v.
Bryant, 4 Scan. 387 ; Warren v. IT' l-
bridge, 61 Il1. 173; Martin v. Wirts, 11
Bradw. (Ill.) 567. And the right of
election must he exercised within a rea-
sonable time after discovery of the frand:.
Bulkley v. Morgan, 46 Conn. 393;
Emrson v. Me1 Xamara, 41 Me. 565 ;
Johnson v. J11cLane, 7 Blackf. 501 ; Stew-
art v. Dougherty, 3 Diana 479 ; Jhopkns
v. Appleby, I Stark. 477 ; Cash v. Giles,
3 Car. & P. 407.
It is a general principle that a vendor
electing to rescind, must rescind the con-
tract in toto, and phce the other party in
statu quo: Cushing v. Ilyman, 38 MIe.
589 ; Tisdale v. Bnckinore, 33 Id. 461
Cushman v. Marshall, 21 Id. 122 ; Ayers
v. Hew'ett, 19 Id. 281 ; Norton v.
Young, 3 Greenl. 30 ; Poor v. lWood-
burn, 25 Vt. 234 ; Allen v. Edgerton,
3 Id. 443; Kiimball v. Canningham,
4 Mass. 502; Moyer v. Shoemaker, 5
Bal. 322; Jhher v. Conant, 3 E. 1).
Smith 199; Fisl,er v. 1Frednhaull, 21
Barb. 82; Ratter v. Blake, 2 Ifar. &
J. 353; Jolnson v. McLane, 7 Blackf.
501; .lloriarty v. Stofferan, 89 Il.
528: Jennings v. Gage, 13 Id. 612;
Barhenau v. Horney, 12 Id. 336 ; Wfreed
v. Morris, 7 Wis. 503. And if this can
not be done, his remedy is by an action
on the case for deceit: Hogan v. lre~yer,
5 Hill 389; Connor v. Hlenderson, 15
Mass. 319; Perley v. Balch, 23 Pick.
283; Coolidge v. Brigham, 1 Met. 550;
Ilammond v. Buckmaster, 22 Vt. 375;
Blackburn v. Smith, 2 Exch. 783; Hnt
v. Silk, 5 East. 449 ; Beedv. Blandford,
2 You. & Jer. 278.
The tender back of the consideration
received must generally be made before
trial, but it is sufficient to tender a note
at the trial: Thurston v. Blanchar, 22
Pick. 18; Niclos v. Michael, 23 N.
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Y. 264; -yan v. Brant, 42 fIl. 78;
Emerson v. McNamara, 41 Me. 565. "
Having made his election the vendor
is bound by the choice, and can 'not
afterwards pursue an inconsistent rem-
edy: .Joslin v. Cowee, 52 N. Y. 90 ; Bank
v. Beale, 34 Id. 473 ; Fanchon v. Good-
man, 29 Barb. 315; Butler v. Ruldreth,
5 Met. 49 ; Brinley v. Tibbits, 7 Greenl.
70; Junciris v. Simpson, 14 Me. 364;
Dibble v. Sheldon, 10 Blatchf. 178: Floyd
v. Browne, I fRawle 121 ; Kitchen v.
Campbell, 3 Wils. 308; Bennet v. Fran-
cis, 4 Esp. 28; Brewer v. Sparrow, 1
M. & R. 2; Bulkley v. Morgan, 46
Conn. 394; Morris v. Rexford, 18 N.
Y. 552.
If the fraud is discovered during the
course of legal proceedings, to enforce the
contract, the vendor must not proceed to
judgment, or he will be held to have
affirmed the contract : Lloyd v. Brewster,
4 Paige 541.
In Dean v. 'ates, 22 Ohio St. 388, a
suit in attachment was held not an
affirmance of the contract: contra, Bul-
ter v. Bildreth, 5 Met. 49 ; while in
Gray v. St.J'ohn, 35 Ill. 222, it was re-
gardeld sufficient evidence to prove a
prima fade affirmance.
Upon the distinct question in the main
case the precedents arc few. In VorWhees
v. Earl, 2 Hill 288, it seems to have been
held that a vendee cannot rescind as £,
p-art of goods sold on account of fraud,
and affirm as to the remainder.
In Aforford v. Peck, 46 Conn. 384, it
was admitted as law, that where a por-
tion of goods fraudulently obtained have
been resold to a third party having
knowledge of the fraud, the fact that the
original vendee has been sued in assump-
sit for the portion not sold by him, will
not bar an action of replevin for the por-
tion in possession of the second vendee ;
the court recognising the distinction that
a sale may be affirmed as part of goods
sold and rescinded as to the remainder,
where the division of the property was
beyond the control of the original vendor.
This rule would seem conformable to jus-
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An auctioneer has all the liabilities of an ordinary agent. He is not, like a sheriff,
a public officer.
An auctioneer selling goods "as auctioneer," but without naming the person for
whom he sells, is liable as if selling for himself, and if the title turns out defective,
may be sued by the vendee, independently of the doctrine of implied warranty of
title, in an action for money had and received, on the ground that the consideratien
has wholly failed.
An auctioneer sold a piano at public auction, " as auctioneer," but without nam-
ing his principal. One with a superior title to the piano took it from the vendee, who
thereupon sued the auctioneer to recover back the purchase-money. Held, that the
auctioneer was liable.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ROBINSON, J.-One Weeks, being in the possession of a piano
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under a contract of hiring, sent it to the ware rooms of the appel-
lants, who are auctioneers, to be sold. It was sold by them at
auction without disclosing the name of the owner, and was bought
by the appellee. The piano was subsequently replevied by the
owner, and this suit is brought by the purchaser against the auc-
tioneers, to recover the money paid on account of the purchase.
Now we take the law to be well settled that one selling pro-
perty as an agent, without disclosing the name of the principal,
binds himself personally. In such cases the purchaser has the
right to rely on the responsibility of the agent, by whom the sale is
made, and is not obliged to rely on the responsibility of an unknown,
and perhaps irresponsible principal. The same will apply to sales
made by auctioneers.
Whether the doctrine of implied warranty of title attaches to a
sale made by an auctioneer, for the breach of which he should be
liable for unliquidated damages, is a question not necessary to be
decided in this case. Be this as it may, it is clear, we think, both in
reason and authority, that if a sale is made by an auctioneer, with-
out disclosing the name of the owner, and the property is afterwards
claimed by a superior title, the purchaser may, in an action for
money had and received, recover the purchase-money of the auc-
tioneer. There is, in such a case, an entire failure of considera-
tion, and the sale having been made by the auctioneer, the only
person known as vendor, it is just and right that he should be
answerable to the purchaser. There is certainly no hardship in
this rule of law, because the auctioneer knows the person on account
of whom the goods are sold, and has it in his power to protect him-
self against loss. Any other rule, would not only be a fraud on
purchasers, but destructive of all confidence in auction sales. So
far back as Hanson v. 1?oberdean, Peake's N. P. 120, Lord KEN-
Yo-. said, that though where an auctioneer names his principal, it is
not proper that he should be liable to an action, yet it is a very
different case when the auctioneer sells the commodity without say-
ing on whose behalf he sells, and in such a case the purchaser is
entitled to look to him personally for the completion of the contract.
We have not been able to find a single case in conflict with the rule
thus laid down. On the cotitrary, it is sustained by all the sub-
sequent decisions, both in England and this country: Jones v.
Littledale, 6 A. & E. 486 ; Mills v. .Hunt, 20 Wend. 431 ; Frank-
lin v. Lamond, 4 C. B. 637. And in all the text-books the prin-
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ciple is laid down in the broadest terms. In his work on agency,
Judge STORY says: 11 Thus, where a contract is made with an auc-
tioneer for the purchase of goads at public sale, and no disclosure is
made of the principal on whose behalf the commodity is sold, the
auctioneer will be liable to the purchaser to complete the contract,
although from the nature of public sales, it is plain he acts as agent
only :" Story on Agency, *sect. 267. Again, in Addison on Con-
tracts, the author says: "Every auctioneer who sells without, at
the time of the sale, disclosing the name of his principal, contracts
personally;" p. 642. In Babington on Auctions, 9 Law Lib., sect.
185, the rule is laid down: "When an auctioneer does not disclose
the name of his prihcipal at the time of the sale, he is personally
liable to an action for damages for not completing the contract."
The cases relied on by the appellant, are cases in which the sales
were made by administrators or executors or trustees, or by.sheriffs
or other officials, in which the nature and chaxacter of the sales
and the objects for which they are made, are well known to the
purchaser. Besides; one making a sale in an official capacity, can-
not, for reasons of public policy, be held personally responsible, for
otherwise, "no one," as Judge ARCHER says in Hoebee v. Gardner,
2 Har. & Gill 176, "could be induced to accept the office." It can
hardly be said that an auctioneer is in this sense a public officer.
There is a tax, it is true, upon the receipts of sales made by him,
and he is appointed and required to give bond, but the tax is laid
for the purpose of revenue, and the appointment and requirement
to give bond, are provisions of the law to secure the prompt payment
of the tax as thus levied. His business is essentially a private one;
he may sell or not, as he pleases, and is not, in any respect, under
the slightest obligation to the public. For these reasons the judg-
ment below must be affirmed.
ALVEY, C. J., delivered the following dissenting opinion, in which
Judge BRYAN concurred. -The theory upon which this case was
tried in the court below must have been that there .was an implied
warranty of title by the auctioneers who sold the piano to the plaintiff
at public auction. Hence the court was asked to affirm, and did
affirm at the instance of the plaintiff, that if it should be found
upon the evidence that the defendants had no title to the piano,
and no lawful or rightful authority to sell the same, and that the
true owner of the piano, subsequent to the sale, replevied the same
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from the plaintiff, then the verdict must be for the plaintiff, though
it should be further found that the defendants, at the time of the
sale, were auctioneers, and that the piano was sold by them at
public auction. And on the part of the defendants, they refused to
affi m, that if it should be found from the evidence that the piano
had been brought to the auction rooms of the defendants for sale at
public auction, and that they made an advance thereon, and adver-
tised and sold the piano expressly in their character of auctioneers,
in the usual course of making auction sales, and that the defendants
acted in all respects in good faith, and the plaintiff knew at the time
that they were acting in their representative character of auctioneers
and not as owners; and that upon making the purchase the plain-
tiff paid the price of the piano and removed the same, and the defend-
ants settled their accounts with the party for whom they sold the
piano before they had any notice of any question in regard to the
title to the piano, or of the plaintiffs claim to recover back the price
paid therefor ; then the plaintiff was not entitled to recover back the
price thus paid. These propositions manifestly had reference to
and were meant to present the question, whether or not there was
an implied warranty of title by the auctioneers; and the affirmative
of that proposition seems to have been held by the court, for it not
only granted the plaintiff's prayer but in the judgment rendered
(the court acting without a jury), the amount recovered is the full
price paid for the piano with interest, and not simply the amount
retained by the defendants for the advance made by them before the
sale; a result that could not have been arrived at, upon the facts
of the case, except upon the theory of an implied warranty of title.
There can be no doubt that as a general principle, in every sale
of personal chattels there exists an implied warranty of title by the
vendor, unless such warranty is expressly negatived, or negatived
by the special circumstances of the case : Ilfockbee v. Gardner, 2 H.
& G. 176; Rockwell v. Young, 60 Md. 563. The doctrine of
caveat emrtor is but an exception to, or modification of this general
principle, in its application to the sales of personal property. And
the question here is, whether in a sale of a personal chattel by an
official licensed auctioneer, in the city of Baltimore, made in the
usual course of his business, there is an implied warranty of title by
the auctioneer personally, where the name of the principal is not
given at the time of the sale.
A general licensed auctioneer, appointed by the state, is a general
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commercial agent, and as such, he is subject to regulations in the
performance of his duties by the statute law of the state. For, the
city of Baltimore, auctioneers not to exceed twenty in number, are
authorized to be appointed by the governor of the state, by and
with the advice and .consent of the senate, for the term of two years.
He qualifies by obtaining a license, for a fee to the state, and by
giving bond, conditioned for the duties prescribed by law upon his
sales, "and that he will in all things, well, truly and faithfuily
behave and conform himself according to the true intent and mean-
ing of the law." The duties upon sales are prescribed, and the
auctioneer is required to make quarterly reports of his sales, and to
account for the duties thereon, and his commissions are regulated
by law. And any person acting as auctioneer without conforming
to the provisions of law, is declared to be guilty of a misdemeanor:
vol. 2, Code, sects. 85 to 131, as modified by the Act of 1872,
ch. 249.
By a well settled principle of law, an auctioneer has a special
property in the goods intrusted to him for sale, and he has a lien
on the same, and the proceeds thereof for the charges of sale, his
commissions, and the auction duty which he is bound to pay. And
having such special property in the goods intrusted to him be may
sue the purchaser thereof in his own name, or in the name of his
principal, at his election. He is also for certain purposes deemed
personally the vendor to the purchaser at the sale, unless the name
of the principal be disclosed, and the latter be treated as the party
making the sale. But -this is so only in a special sense; for in
many cases the auctioneer is deemed the agent of both vendor
and vendee, though the name of the principal vendor be not dis-
closed by the auctioneer at the time of the sale: Williams v. Mil-
lUngton, 1 H. Bl. 81; Story Ag., sects. 27, 107, 108. If, however,
the sale at auction be made without disclosing the name of the
principal at the time of sale, the purchaser is entitled to look
to the auctioneer personally for the delivery of the goods sold, and
the completion of the contract ; and if default be committed in this
respect, the auctioneer is personally liable to the purchaser in
damages: 2 Kent Com. 536; Hanson v. 1olerdeau, Peake's Cas.
120; Woolfe v. Home, 2 Q. B. Div. 355. But it does not follow
from this that he is to be held liable as for an implied warranty of
title to the goods sold.
In England, until within a comparatively recent period, it had
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been an unsettled question, whether, in any case of the sale of a
chattel in possession, and where the possession passed to the vendee
by the contract of sale, there was any implied warranty of title.
But since the case of -Eicholz v. Bannister, 17 C. B. (N. S.) 708,
decided in 1864, it seems to be regarded as settled, according to
Mr. Benjamin (Sales, 2d English ed. 523), that "a sale of per-
sonal chattels implies an affirmation by the vendor that the chattel
is his, and therefore he warrants the title unless it be shown by the
facts and circumstances of the sale that the vendor did not intend
to assert ownership, but only to transfer such interest as he might
have in the chattel sold." This is the English rule as between the
vendor, the owner of the chattel or the party who asserts owner-
ship in himself and the vendee. But does the same rule apply as
between an official auctioneer, who sells in a representative capacity
and the purchaser of the chattel at an auction sale? Of course, if
the auctioneer in fact sells his own goods, or if lie affirms the owner-
ship to be in himself, or if lie refuses upon request to disclose the
name of his principal, he would be held to warrant the title; or if
he make fraudulent representations as to the title of the property
sold by him, whereby the purchaser is deceived to his injury, he
would be liable upon failure of title as for deceit. But the reason
of the rule upon which the doctrine of implied warranty of title
is founded would seem clearly not to apply where the sale is simply
made in fact by the auctioneer, bona fide, in his representative char-
acter, with no assertion or affirmation of title in himself, or repre-
sentation whereby the purchaser is deceived. And hence with the
rule established in England as I have stated it, it is laid down in all
the recent text writers treating of the subject, that "whenever a
man sells goods generally, and not in any particular character or
capacity, such as auctioneer, agent, sheriff, pawnbroker, pledgee,
&c., he must be taken to sell as owner ;" but "whenever a man does
not sell goods as owner, but in some special character or capacity, and
the purchaser has notice thereof, he is bound to look into the title of
his vendor; for there is not under such circumstances, any implied
warranty of title on the part of the vendor." 2 Add. on Oontr.
(8th ed.) 971, 972; Bateman on Auction Sales 198; see Simms
v, 1M1arryat, 20 L. J. Q. B..458. The auctioneer or party selling
in a special character, merely undertakes that he does not at the
time he sells, know of.any defect in his authority or right to sell ;
and he cannot be made responsible after he has paid over the pro-
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ceeds to his principal, for the payment of the purchase-mofiey to the
vendee, unless it can be shown that he knew he had no right to sell
or to pay over, and that consequently, his conduct was fraudulent:
2 Add. on Contr. 972; Chapman v. Spiller, 14 Q. B. 621. The
same general principle is laid down by the American text writers,
as will be seen by reference to 1 Pars. on Contr. (4th ed.) 456, 458,
and notes ; and to Story on *Sales, sect. 867 a. The general dodtrine
is well illustrated by the case of the sale of an unredeemed pledge
by a pawnbroker. The pawnbroker as bailee, like a general auction-
eer, is placed in possession of the goods, and he has power of sale
upon default of the pawnor. In making the sale he only warrants the
subject-matter of the sale to be a pledge, and that the time for its
redemption has expired. He does not by implication warrant the
title, or that the purchaser will not be evicted. As he sells in a
special character, lie is understood only to sell such interest as he
may have in the subject-matter of the sale; and if the purchaser
does not 'look into the matter of title, and it subsequently appears
that the pledgor had no title to pledge, nor the pawnbroker to sell,
and the purchaser is evicted, he cannot recover compensation for his
loss upon any principle of implied warranty of title. This would
seem to be settled upon unquestionable authority. In the leading
case of Morley v. Attenborough, 8 Exch. 500, the defendant, a
pawnbroker, had a harp pledged with him in the way of his business,
and the time having elapsed for its redemption, and the pledge being
unredeemed, offered it for sale through certain auctioneers who sold
it to the plaintiff. It turned out that the harp had been pledged to
the defendant by a person who had no title to it, and the real owner
obliged the plaintiff to give it up, after it had been delivered to
him by the defendant. And the question, and only question as the
case was presented on the pleadings, was 's to the extent which the
defendant by implication warranted against the eviction of the plain-
tiff. - PARKE, B., who delivered a thoroughly considered judgment,
in the course of his opinion said, "We do not suppose that there
would be any doubt, if the articles were bought in a shop professedly
carried on for the sale of goods, that the shopkeeper must be con-
sidered as warranting that those who purchase will have a good title
to keep the goods purchased. In such a case the vendor 'sells as
his own,' and that is what is equivalent to a warranty of title. But
in the case now under consideration, the defendant can be made
responsible only as on a sale of a forfeited pledge eo nomine.
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Though the harp may not have been distinctly stated in the auction-
eer's catalogue to be a forfeited pledge, yet the auctioneer had no
authority from the defendant to sell it except as such. The defend-
ant, therefore, cannot be taken to have sold it with a more extensive
liability than such a sale would have imposed upon him; and the
question is, whether on such a sale, accompanied with possession,
there, is any assertion of an absolute title to sell, or *only an asser-
tion that the article has been pledged with him and the time allowed
for redemption passed." And the conclusion was, that it was
unreasonable to consider the pawnbroker, from the nature of his
occupation, as having undertaken anything more than that the sub-
ject-matter of sale was a pledge and irredeemable, and that he was
not cognisant of any defect of title to it ; and it was so held by the
whole court.
The distinction thus made between the case of a party selling as
owner and affirming the title to the chattel to be in himself, and the
case of a sale made by a party in his representative capacity and
without any such affirmation of title, is founded in the plainest
reason and justice. A licensed bonded auctioneer ir the city of
Baltimore is not only an agent for those who intrust their property
to him for sale, but lie is a public officer. He is required to account
to a public functionary for the duties on his sales and to his princi-
pals for the proceeds of the sales made by him, and that without
delay.
And that being so, there is no principle in the law better settled
than that where one person deals with another, knowing that other
to be an agent, though even of an undisclosed principal ; such per-
son has no right to require the agent to restore to him money which
the agent has accounted for and paid over to his principal before
notice of any adverse claim. When money so paid to an agent has
been once bona fide parted with, without notice, the liability of the
agent ceases, and the claim of the party paying it can be enforced
only against the principal to whom the money has been paid over:
Holland v. Russell, 1 B. & A. 424; Shand v. Grant, 15 C. B.
(N. S.) 324" -. dwards v. Hodding, 5 Taunt. 815. If he is to be
held to warrant, by implication, the title of all the property he sells
how is he to be indemnified against liability upon payment over of
the proceeds of sale ? It is obvious, his position would be one of
great peril, unless he were to proclaim the name of his principal in
the sale of each and every article sold by him, and to do that would,
VOL. XXXIV.-33
SEEMU-LLER v. FUCHS.
in many cases, defeat one of the .statutory objects of auctioa sales at
regular auction rooms, at which parties might not, for obvious and
entirely justifiable reasons, desire their names to be proclaimed in
connection with the property offered for sale. If any purchaser
desired the name of the real owner, it would be the duty of the
auctioneer to disclose it; or, upon his refusal, he would be held to
have assumed the position and liability of such owner. This rule
would seem to afford to purchasers all the protection that they could
in reason ask of the auctioneer. It was said by the Court of Ap-
peals, in Mockbee v. Gardner, supra, in speaking of the exemption
of executors, trustees, &c., from liability for implied warranty of
title, that the exemption of such agents from personal liability on
such warranties would seem to be indispensable. For, as there
asked, who would accept an office of the kind, if he were to become
necessarily the guarantee of the good .title to him whom he repre-
sents, in all the property committed to his charge, and which he
might be required to sell? In all cases in which the title sold was
ascertained to be defective after final distribution of the estate, the
trustee, if a recovery were had against him, would have to look for
indemnity to creditors, distributees, &c. In most instances, his
prospect of security would never be realized, and no power is given
him to retain for such a contingency. And while that is so with
respect to executors, trustees and others, the same reasoning applies
to the case of an official auctioneer. He, too, is required to pay
over the proceeds of sale, and if the title of the property were after-
wards found to be defective, he might, in many cases, be left without
means of indemnification. Therefore, it would seem to be unrea-
sonable to hold, that an official auctioneer, when acting in his
representative capacity, and in the usual course of his business,
warrants by implication the title to the property sold by him, in the
absence of other circumstances, to which I have referred, by which
he may fix liability upon himself as if he were owner.
It is supposed that the case of Pisher v. Rieman, 12 Md. 497,
has some bearing upon the question under consideration. But an
examination of that case will show that it has no bearing whatever.
That was a case where the defendant, a bill andnote broker, acting
for an undisclosed principal, sold and passed by delivery merely,
without endorsement, a negotiable promissory note to the -plaintiff,
making no express warranty or representation in regard to the
genuineness of the signatures to the note, and being entirely ignorant
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of the fact that any of them were forged ; but two of the signatures
thereto proved to be forged, and the question was whether thre was
an implied warranty by the broker of the genuineness of the signa-
tures to the note ; and the court held that there was not. That the
only implied warranty involved in the sale was, that the broker was
lawfully entitled to dispose of the note to the plaintiff, about which
there was no contention. The broker acting in good faith had the
right to dispose of the paper on the market for what he could get
for it, and there was no question as to the existence of any para-
mount title to the paper in a third party. That case, therefore,
can have no special bearing upon the question involved in the case
before us.
Here there can be no pretence whatever, that the plaintiff was
not aware of the fact that the defendants were acting in their repre-
sentative character as auctioneers in the sale of the piano. lie states
himself that he had examined the piano at the warehouse of the
defendants before it was offered for sale, and that he had been
informed by one of the defendants that they had made an advance
upon it of $100, in anticipation of the sale ; and with that informa-
tion he became the purcliaser at public auction. It is made clear
from the evidence that the legal title to the piano was in F. G.
Smith, and that it had been hired to one Weeks, from whence it got
into the possession of Davis, wdo placed it with the defendants for
sale. There is no evidence, however, to show that the defendants
were aware, or had any reasonable ground to suspect, that the title
of Davis, or that of the party for whom he acted, was not good.
And upon these facts I am clearly of opinion that there was no
implied warranty of title by the defendants.
The auction sale, however, failing to pass title to the plaintiff,
and the property having been taken from him by the owner, there
was a failure of consideration for the money paid to the defendants
on the purchase. And as it appears that the larger part of the money
so paid is still retained by the defendants, for the advance made on
the piano, and for expenses and commissions, that much of the price
is, in contemplation of law, money had and received for the use of
plaintiff, and he may, under the declaration of this case, recover it
of the defendants. The latter cannot, either by law or equity, apply
the money received of the plaintiff, on a consideration which has -
wholly failed, to the payment of a debt due from a party who had
no title to the property.
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The right of the plaintiff, then, to recover of the defendants, is
fully recognised by the Court of Appeals, in the case before referred
to, of Mockbee v. Gardner, 2 H. & J. 177, 178. See also, Frank-
lin v. Armfield, 7 G. & J. 407.
From what I have said, it follows, that the instruction granted at
the instance of the plaintiff, based as it is on the theory of an im-
plied warranty of title by the defendants personally, was erroneous;
but that there was no error in refusing the prayers offered by the
defendants. In my opinion, therefore, the judgment of the court
below should be reversed, And a new trial awarded; and in this
opinion, Judge BRYAN authorizes me to say he concurs.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
EDGERTON v. MICHELS.
The general rule in this country is, that where there is a sale of chattels in the
vendor's possession at the time, at a fair price, there is always an implied warranty
of title, unless the facts and circumstances are such as to warrant a different conclu-
sion.
One intrusted with the possession, management, control and disposal of goods to
be sold, is an agent and not a broker, and is liable'upon an implied warranty of
title.
APPEAL from Circuit Court, Milwaukee County.
This was an action to recover the price of goods sold by plaintiff
to defendant. The defence was that the goods had been stolen and
were afterwards reclaimed from defendants by the true owner. The
court below directed a verdict for plaintiff. The facts sufficiently
appear in the opinion.
Jenkins, Winkler, Fish S mith, for respondents.
Markham & Noyes, for appellants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CASSODAY, J.-Upon the facts stated was the court justified in
directing a verdict against the defendants on their counter-claim,
and in favor of the plaintiffs for the full amount of their claim ?
The cattle had been stolen by Eddy, alias Sherman, prior to the
sale to the defendants, and that fact was unknown to both parties
until after the plaintiffs had paid Eddy, and the defendants had paid
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the plaintiffs, and the cattle had been shipped to Chicago, where
they were reclaimed by the true owner. The plaintiffs contend
that they were middle-men, brokers or agents for Eddy, who was
present, to the knowledge of the defendants, during the negotia-
tions, and assented to the price agreed upon ; and hence that they
are not liable upon an implied warranty of title. The defendants
insist that the plaintiffs took the cattle from Eddy into their own
possession, negotiated the sale to them in their own name, procured
the weighing and yarding of the cattle, and the weighmaster's
ticket for the same, advanced to Eddy the full price the defendants
agreed to give, less the yardage and their commissions, when Eddy
disappeared, and then that the plaintiffs retained the cattle until
two days afterwards, when they delivered the ticket to the defend-
ants and received from them the full contract price; and that these
things, taken together, made the plaintiffs factors or commission-
men for the sale of the cattle. We think the evidence was sufficient
to have justified the jury in finding the fats as claimed by the de-
fenldants. Upon such facts were the plaintiffs in the transaction
faetors, commission-men, or mere middle-men-brokers-agents?
An agent employed to sell personal property intrusted to his posses-
sion by or for his principal, for a compensation commonly called
" factorage" or "commission," is a factor. As such he may sell
on credit, unless contrary to instructions or custom. He may sell
for his principal in his own name, ard then sue in his own name for
the price. Ile is intrusted with the possession, management, con-
trol and disposal of the goods to be sold, and has a special property
in them, and a lien upon them. Ile may retain possession until
his advances, expenses and commissions are paid : 1 Story Ag.,
§§ 33, 34 a, 110-113 ; Price v. Wisconsin lM. J . Ins. (Co., 43
Wis. 276, 277; i 1eGraft v. .Rugee, 60 Id. 409; 58 Amer. Dec.
159-171.
On the other hand a broker is an agent, employed to make bar-
gains and contracts between other persons in matters of trade, com-
merce or navigation, for a compensation commonly called "broker-
age." Ile is not authorized to buy or to sell property in his own
name, but only in the name of his principal. Ile is not intrusted
with the custody or possession of the property bought or sold, and
consequently has no special property or lien upon it. HIe is strictly,
therefore, a middle-man, or intermediate negotiator between the
parties. Ordinarily he has no authority merely by virtue of his
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agency to receive payment for property sold by him: Story Ag.,
§§ 28, 34, 109; Price v. Wisconsin H. 4 . Ins. Co., supra. We
are clearly of the opinion that the evidence given upon the trial
would have justified the jury in finding that in the transaction in
question the plaintiffs acted as factors, and not merely as brokers or
middle-men. Treating them as factors, as we must on this appeal,
they must be held to all -the responsibilities of factors -selling
property in their own name for a disclosed principal. The fact that
the plaintiffs fully paid Eddy for the cattle some considerable time
prior to delivering the weighmaster's ticket to the defendants,
and receiving from them pay for the cattle, makes the case partake
very much of a purchase by the plaintiffs,. and then a resale by them
to the defendants. It is well settled in this country, that the sale
of chattels acquired from any one who had stolen them, passes no
title even to an honest purchaser, and the true owner may maintain
an action for the property without any previous demand: Dame v.
Baldwin, 8 Mass. 518 : .Heckle v. Lurvey, 101 Id. 345; Hoffman
v. Garow, 22 Wend. 285. The same is true of chattels sold by one
who is not the owner and has no authority to sell: Coombe v. Gor-
den, 59 Me. 111 ; Bryant v. Whitcher, 52 N. H. 158; Gilmore v.
Newton, 9 Allen 171 ; Quinn v. -Davis, 78 Penn. St. 15 ; Ventress
v. Smith, 10 Pet. 161; Black v. Jones, 64N. 0. 318; Fawcett v.
Osborn, 32 Ill. 411; Wheelwright v. Depeyster, 1 Johns. 471.
The question whether an implied warranty of title attached to
the sale from the plaintiffs to the defendants, does not seem to be
definitively and conclusively settled as a matter of law. Undoubt-
edly, the civil law annexed such a warranty on the part of the ven-
dor to every sale of a chattel. The earlier English cases indicated
a contrary doctrine: Morley v. Attenborough, 3 Exch. 500. The
later English cases indicate that such a warranty may be inferred
from the mere fact of sale under certain circumstances. Thus in
Bichholz v. Bannister, 17 0. B. N. S. 708, it was held:
"In the case of goods sold in an open shop or warehouse, there
is an implied warranty on the part of the seller, that he is the
owner of the goods ; and if it turns out otherwise, as where the
goods are claimed by the true owner from whom they have been
stolen, the buyer may recover back the price as money paid upon a
consideration which has failed." The general rule in this country
undoubtedly is, that where there is a sale of chattels in the vendor's
possession at the time, at a fair price, there is always an implied
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warranty of title, unless the facts and circumstances are such as to
warrant a different conclusion. For discussions of the question and
authorities bearing upon it. see Lane v. Romer, 2 Pin. 404; Cos-
tigan v. Hawkins, 22 Wis. 74 ; Shattuck v. Green, 104 Mass. 42;
Patee v. Pelton, 48 Vt. 182; Peoldes' Bank v. Ifurtz, 99 Penn.
St. 844 ; 2 Schouler's Per. Prop., sects. 875-379 ; 2 Benj. Sales,
sects. 948-964; Scott v. Rlix, 62 Am. Dec. 458 and notes, 460-
468; Paweett v. Osborn, supra ; Burt v. Dewey, 40 N. Y. 288;
Defreeze v. Trunzier, 1 Johns. 274; 22 Am. L. Reg. 85.
The case was not submitted to the jury at all, and, of course, was
not determined upon the theory indicated. There certainly is no
conclusive presumption of law in a case like this, but rather a mixed
question of law and fact. As the case now stands, we refrain from
any further discussion. The judgment of the circuit court is
reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
There are two main points involved in
these decisions, as follows: First, In a
tale of chattels, admitting that there is no
warranty of title, can the purchase-
money be recovered, if the title turns out
to he bad, on a count for money had and
received as for a consideration which has
wholly failed ? Second, Is there any
implied warranty of title where the ven-
dor sells, not as owner but in sone par-
ticular repreentative capacity ?
L Cawat Emptor as to Tit.e.-The
rule of caveat (mptor applies where there
is no warranty of title, just as it does
when there is no warranty of quality,
and the purchaser has no remedy. See
Cro. Jac. 197, per TANFIELD, C. B. ;
Noy's Maxims, c. 2 ; Co. Lit. 102 a ; 2
Kent Corn. 478 ; MIedina v. Stouihton,
I Salk. 219 ; Morley v. Attenborough, 3
Exch. 500, 510 ; Eichholz v. Bannister, 17
V. B. N. S. 708, 722 ; Scranton v.
Clark, 39 N. Y. 220, 223 ; Iluntingdon
v. Hall, 36 Me. 501, 503. In Noy's
Maxims, c. 42, it is said, "If I take the
horse of another man and sell him, and tte
owner take him over again, I may have
an action of debt for the money ; for the
oargain was perfect by the delivery of
the horse, anti caveat imtor;" and in
Coke Lit. 102 a, Coke says, " note that
by the citil law every man is bound to
warrant the thing lie selleth or conveyeth,
albeit, there be no express warranty ; but
the common law bindeth him not unless
there be a warranty ; citler in deed or
in law, for caveat emptor." In Morley v.
.Attenborough, 3 Exch. 500, 510, it is said
"There is by the law of England no
warranty of title in the actual contract
of sale, any more than there is of quality.
The rule ofcareat emptor applies to both."
In Eiehholz v. Bannister, 17 C. B. N. S.,
708, 721, it issaid that where there is no
warranty, " caveat emptor, you have no
remedy, though it turn out that I have
no title."
This means that if I buy an article the
title of which is not warranted, and the
title proves bad, I have no remedy, I
cannot recover tle price paid for money
had and received for my use, on the
ground that the consideration has wholly
failed ; I have bought at my risk; I have
gotten what I bargained for, and if it is
taken from me I must bear the loss.
Morley v. Attenboroagh and Ehholz v.
Bannister, cited above, were both cases
where suit was brought on the common
counts. Indeed itwas only because there
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was no remedy without a warranty, that
the doctrine of implied warranty of title*
grew up and was gradually extended till
now the cases where the doctrine dois
not apply are the exceptions.
II. Implied Warranty of Title.-Rule.
A warranty of title is implied when a
man sells goods which are in his posses-
sion as owner, but not if the goodi are
out of the vendor's possession or in his
possession in some particular capacity.
1. A warranty of title is implied in all
sales of chattels by the vendor in posses-
sion of them; if nothing further appears,
it is presumed that he holds them as
owner and covenants and warrants that
he is owner, i. e., that he warrants the
title to them: Benj. Sales, sect. 627, &c. ;
Shattuck v. Green, 104 Mass. 42, 45;
Byrnszde v. Burdeite, 15 W. Va. 702;
see Gaylor v. Copes, 16 Fed. Rep. 49
Cozzins v. Whitaker, 3 Stew. & Por.
322 ; Ricks v. Dillahunty, 8 Port. 134;
Williamson v. Sammons, 34 Ala. 691;
Gross v. Kierski, 41 Cal. 111 ; Lines v.
Smith, 4 Ia. 47 ; Morris v. Thompson,
85 Ill. 16; Marshall v. Duke, 51 Ind.
62 ; Hackleman v. Harrison, 50 Id. 156 ;
Payne v. Rodden, 4 Bibb. 304 ; Scott v.
Scott, 2 A. K. Marsh. 217; Chancellor
v. Wiggins, 4 B. Mon. 201 ; Hunting-
don v. Hall, 36 Me. 501 ; Haler. Smith,
6 Greenl. 420; Eldridge v. Wadleigh, 3
Fairf. 372; Butler v. Tqfts, 13 Me.
302; Ricev. Forsyth, 41 Md. 389; Mock-
bee v. Gardner, 2 Har. & Gill 176 ;
Whitney v. Heywood, 6 Cush. 82, 86;
Bennett v. Bartlett, 6 Id. 225 ; Coolidge
v. Brigham. I Met. 551 ; Dorr v. Fisher,
I Csh. 273; Emerson v. Brigham, 10
Mass. 202; Hunt v. Sackett, 31 Mich.
18 ; Storm v. Smith, 43 Miss. 497 ; Dry-
den v. Kellogg, 2 Mo. App. 87; Sar-
_gent v. Currier, 49 N. H. 310; Bechet
v. Smithers, 50 N. Y. Super. Ct. 381 !
Vibbard v. Johnson, 19 Johns. 78 ; Case
v. Hall, 24 Wend. 102 ; Burt v. Dewey,
40 N. Y. 283; McCoy v. Artcher, 3
Barb. 323; Heermance v. Trernoy, 6
Johns. 5; Sweet v. Colgate, 20 Id. 196;
Rew v. Barber, 3 Cowen 272; McKnight
v. Devlin, 52 N. Y. 399, 401 ; Hoe v.
Sanborn, 21 Id. 552, 556 ; Colcock v.
Goode, 3 McCord 513 ; Darst v. Brock-
way, 11 Ohio 462; Whitaker v. East-
wick, 75 Penn. St. 229 ; Gookin v. Gra-
ham, 5 Humph. 484 ; Roper v. Rowlett,
7 Lea 320 ; Patee v. Pelton, 48 Vt. 182.
2. But there is no such implied war-
ranty if the chattels are not in the posses-
sion of the vendor at the time of the sale
Huntingdon v. Ball, 36 Me. 501, 503;
Byrnside v. Burdette, 15 W. Va. 70"2;
see Pratt v. Philbrook, 33 Me. 23;
Emerson v. Brigham, 10 Mass. 202;
Long v. "Hickcingbottom, 28 Miss. 772 ;
Scranton v. Clark, 39 N. Y. 220 ; Mc Coy
Artcher, 3 Barb. 323; Dresser v. Ains-
worth, 9 Id. 619 ; Edick v. Grim, 10 Id.
445; Andres v. Lee, 1 Dev. & Bat. Eq.
318; cases cited above.
3. And one who sells a chattel in a
particular capacity does not implicitly
warrant the title thereto. A warranty
is implied only "if the vendor sells them
as his own :" 2 BI. Com. 451. Not if
he sells "as agent foranother :" 2 Kent
Com. 478 ; Hopkins v. Grinnell, .28
Barb. 533, 537, as Story puts it, "So,
also, the character in which the vendor
sells may perhaps, prevent this implica-
tion of warranty-as if he be a pawn-
broker, or officer of the law, or occupy
any known position in which he does not
pretend to be an owner or to assume
personal responsibilities :" Story Sales,
367 a, or to quote Addison: " When-
ever a man does not sell as owner, but
in some special character or capacity,
and the purchaser has notice thereof, he
is bound to look into the title of his ven-
dor ; for there is not, under such circum-
stances, any implied warranty of title
on the part of the vendor :" 2 Add
Cont. 972 (Abb. ed. 503). To the same
effect, Bateman : "By a sale of goods
there is in general, an implied warranty
of title, and the vendor cannot recover
the price from the purchaser if the latter
has been obliged to deliver them to a
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third party on account of the vendor's
want of title, unless it appear from the
circnstances of the sale that the vendor
did not intend to assert ownership ; as
where he sold in a particular capacity,
for instance, as auctioneer, sheriff, pawn-
broker, &c." Auctions 193. To the
same effect see 1 Pars. Cont. 573 ; 1
Leake Cont. 109, 402; 1 Whart. Cont.
j 230 ; 2 Schouler's Pers. Prop. 383
(Bailee).
Thus, there is no implied warranty of
title in the case of a sale by one avow-
edly as Administrator or Executor:
M1ockbee v. Gardner, 2 Har. & G. 176,
177 ; Ricks v. Dillahunty, 8 Port. (Ala.)
134, 137; Bingham v. ilaxcy, 15 Ill.
295, 296; Sheppard v. Earles, 20 N. Y.
Supr. 651, 653; Prescott v. Holmes, 7
hicb. Eq. 9, 14 ; Thompson y. M1unger,
15 Tex. 523, 527-Trustee: Mlockbee v.
Gardwr, supra; Worthy v. Johnson, 8
Ga. 236, 241 ; Storm v. Smith, 43 Miss.
497, 501-Mortgagee: Harris v. Lynn,
2. Kan. 281, 285 ; Slhpherd v. Earles,
,upra-B tilee (pawnbroker) : 3orlhy
v. Attenboroagh, 3 Exch. 500 ; Sim3 v.
Marryat, 17 Q. B. 280, 289-Judicial
Olicer: Brown . lVallace, 2 Bland 585,
589; lFrthy v. Johnson, supra-Tax
Collector: Hamilton v. Valiant, 30 Md.
139. 140 : Freeman v. Caldcll, 10 Watts
9, 10- United States Marshal: The
Monte Alrgre, 9 Wheat. 616, 645-
Sheriff: Morgan v. Fncher, I Blackf.
10, 11; State v. Prime, 54 Ind. 450,
459; Rogers v. Smith, 2 Cart. (Ind.)
526, 527; Xeal v. Gillaspy, 56 Ind.
451, 433; 3rnnner v. Brennan, 49 Id.
98, 100; Harrison v. Shanks, 13 Bush
620, 621 H-ensley v.Baker, 10 Mo. 157,
15S ; Rashore v. lrhisler, 3 Watts 490,
493; 'ates v. Bond, 2 MeCord 382,
383; Stone v. Pointer, 5 Muanf. 287, 291
-Constable: Bartholomew v. lJ'arner,
32 Conn. 92, 102-Master (of vessel) :
Page v. Cowaskee, L. R., 1 P. C. App.
127, 144-Agent: Irwin v. Thompson,
27 ian. 643, 648, 649 ; Hopkins. v.
Grinnell, 28 Barb. 533, 537-Broker:
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Fisher v. Reiman, 12 Md. 497 (1858) ;
Baxter v. Duren, 29 Me. 434-Auction-
eer; Bateman (Auctions) 193; Biddle
(Warranties) 261 ; ScJiell v. Stephens,
50 Mo. 375, 379 ; The Monte Allegre,
9 Wheat. 616.
4. The proposition "that one who
acts in a particular capacity does not im-
pliedly warrant the title to chattels he
sells," does not conflict with the rule.
"tat one who acts in his own name
binds himself personally."' An illustra-
tion will clearly show this. Thus, noth-
ing is better settled than that a trustee or
administrator who makes a contract is
personally bound, though he describe
himself as "trustee" or "administra-
tor :" Gill v. Carmine, 55 Md. 339, 342.
And yet it is equally weU settled that one
who sells "as trustee," does not impli-
edly warrant the title: M3Iorkbee v. Gard-
ner, supra; and other cases, supra. The
reason for this is plain. The party who
makes the contract is personally bound
only on its essential obligations ; and, to
quote Benjamin, "a warranty in a sale
of goods is not one of essential elements
of the contract, for a sale is none the less
complete and perfect in the absence of a
warranty; but it is a collateral under-
taking, forming part of the contract by
the agreement of the parties, express or
implied :" Benj. Sales, 2d ed., ? 610.
See Obborn v. Gante, 60 NI. Y. 540 ; and
citations, ante, I.
Any one who, at a sale, states " I do
not pretend to own these goods--the title
is not in me," sells without warranty,
yet he is personally bound by the sale.
And so one who says, .' I sell as trustee"
or "as agent," maybe personallybound
by the sale, although by disclaiming
ownership he prevents a warranty of
title from arising. Therefore, authorities
like Franklin v. Lamond, 4 C..B. 637,
and Mills v. funt, 20 Wend. 431, 17 Id.
333, which decide that an auctioneer is
personally liable for the performance of
the contract of sale, have no bearing,
whatever, on this point.
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Cochrane v. 1ymill, 40 L. T. (N. S:) Hanson v. Robardeau, Feake's N. S. C.
744, and Hoffman v. Carew, 20 Wend. 121; Franklin v. Lamond, supra; Jones
21, are cases in which it is held that an v. Littledale, 6 Ad. & El. 486; Mills v.
auctioneer selling as such, is liable in Hunt, supra, it is held that an auc-
trover if he has no right to sell. The tioneer who sells goods is bound to
same rule would apply to a trustee or deliver them. In none of these cases is
any one else. In Williams v. Millington, the question of an implied warranty of
I H. Black. 81, it is held that an auc- title in any way involved.
tioneer may sue for the price of goods DAviD STL-wA.T.
sold by him for an avowed principal. In Baltimore.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
HADLOCK v. GRAY.
A conveyance to husband and wife, without words of limitation, renders them
tenants by entireties.
Such an estate may be.limited to a life estate, and words clearly expressing an
intention to create an estate for their joint lives, and providing that after the termi
nation of such life-estate, the land shall be divided among the heirs of the husband
and the heirs of the wife, creates a life estate in the husband and wife.
Land was conveyed to husband and wife, and it was provided in the deed that
after the decease of the husband and wife, the land should be equally divided between
the heirs of the husband and the heirs of the wife ; and if the husband died before
the wife, she should hold the property until her diath; or if the wife died first, he
should hold the land until his death, and at the death of both of them, it should be
divided as previously stated: Held, that the husband and wife were not tenants by
entireties ; that the first taker did not take the estate in fee under the hle in Shel-
ley's Case; but the word "heirs" as used in the deed, meant heir apparent, and
did not designate those persons who were to take in indefinite succession.
APPEAL from Fulton Circuit Court.
Essick and Montgomery, for appellants.
S. Keith and J. S. Slick, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ELLIOTT, J.-The appellee alleges in his complaint that he is
the owner of the real estate therein described, and that his title rests
upon a deed executed to him in January 1878, by Isaac Cannon,
who has since died; that Isaac Cannon's title'was founded upon a
-deed executed to him and his wife, Mary Cannon, by Charles Jack-
son and wife, on the twentieth day of April 1876; that this deed,
omitting the formal parts, reads thus: "This indenture witnesseth
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that Charles Jackson and Catharine Jackson his wife, of Fulton
county, in the state of Indiana, convey and warrant to Isaac Can-
non and Mary Cannon, for the sum of $1200, the following real
estate in Fulton county, Indiana, to wit: lot number one hundred
and eighty-two, as designated on the plot of Shryock's and Bozarth's
addition to the town of Rochester, with all the appurtenances there-
unto belonging-the said Isaac Cannon to pay all taxes thereon
from the day of sale. After the decease of said Isaac and Mary
Cannon, the said property to be equally divided between the heirs
of said Isaac Cannon and the heirs of Mary Cannon. If said Isaac
Cannon shall die before his wife, she is to hold the said property
until her death; and provided Mary Cannon shall die first, then
Isaac Cannon is to hold said property until his death, and at the
death of both it is to be divided as above stated."
It is also alloged that both Isaac and Mary Cannon are dead;
that the deed of the former was made after the death of his wife;
that the appellants are the children and grandchildren of Isaac and
Mary Cannon ; that they claim title to the real estate; that they
have in fact no title, and that the appellee is entitled to a decree
quieting his title. The prayer is, that the appellee's title be quieted
and that the appellants be decreed to have no interest in the real
estate.
The controlling question in the case turns upon the effect to be
given the deed executed to Isaac and Mary Cannon. If that deed
vested a fee in them as tenants in entirety, then the judgment below
was right, if it vested in them a life-estate for the lives of both, then
the judgment is wrong. Our opinion is that the deed vested in them
a life-estate and nothing more. It is true, that where real property
is conveyed to husband and wife jointly, and there are no limiting
words in the deed, they will take the estate as tenants in entirety :
Davis v. Clark, 26 Ind. 424; Dodge v. Kinzy, 101 Id. 102, vide,
authorities cited page 105.
But while the general rule is as we have stated it, there may be con-
ditions, limitations and stipulations in the deed conveying the pro-
perty which will defeat the operation of the rule. The denial of
this proposition involves the affirmation of the proposition that a
grantor is powerless to limit or define the estate which he grants,
and this would conflict with. the fundamental principle that a grantor
may, for himself, determine what estate he will grant. To deny this
right would be to deny to parties the right to make their own con-
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tracts. It seems quite clear, upon principle, that a grantor and his
grantees may limit and define the estate granted by the one, and ac-
cepted by the others. Although the grantees may be husband and
wife, Washburne says, in speaking of conveyances to husband and
wife that, "it is always competent to make husband and wife tenants
in common by proper words in the deed or devise which they take,
indicating such intention :'" 1 Wash. Real. Prop. 674. Another
author says, "1 And furthermore, if at any time a joint tenancy or
tenancy in common is desired to be created between man and wife,
a joint estate will be treated as such, if that intention is clearly
expressed in the deed or will ;" Fred. Real Prop. § 244. The
principle which we have asserted is thus declared by an author
whose work for more than half a century has been regarded as autho-
rity, "In point of fact and agreeable to natural reason, the husband
and wife are distinct and individual persons; and accordingly, when
lands are granted to them as tenants in common, thereby treating
them without any respect to their social union, they will hold by'
moieties as other distinct and individual persons would do:" 1 Prest.
Estate 132.
The language employed in the deed under examination, plainly
declares that Isaac and Mary Cannon are not to take as tenants in
entirety. This result would follow from the provision destroying
the survivorship, for this is the grand and essential characteristic
of such a tenancy. Our conclusion need not, however, be placed
on this ground, for the whole force of the language employed is
opposed to the theory that the deed creates an estate in fee in the
husband and wife. The deed does not contain the language essen-
tial to vest in the first taker an estate in fee under the rule in Shel-
ley's Case. There are no words in the deed conveying to Isaac and
Mary Cannon, and their heirs, the estate. On the contrary, the
conveyance is to them for their joint lives, with the provision that
upon the termination of the life-estate, the land shall be divided
among their heirs. When the word "heirs" is used, as it is in
this instance, it does not designate those who shall take an indefinite
succession, but it designates persons who shall take the remainder
as soon as the life estate ends. When that word is employed in the
sense in which it is here used, it means "heirs apparent," and not
"1 heirs." We have, in recent cases, given this question careful con-
sideration, and we do not deem it necessary to again discuss it:
Fountain Coal Co. v. Beckleheimer, 102 Ind. 76; s. c. 1 N. E.
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Rep. 202 ; Shimer v. Hann, 99 Ind. 190, vide authorized p. 193.
There is no reason why the clearly-expressed intention of the par-
ties to the deed should not prevail, for neither the rule in Shelley's
Case, nor any other rule of law, opposes the way of the court to a
natur-1 and reasonable construction of the deed; and surely no one
who reads the deed can doubt that it was intended to vest a life-
estate and not a fee in Isaac Cannon and his wife. What we have
said disposes of the whole case: for it is impossible that a valid
judgment can rest on complaint utterly and irreclaimably bad.
Judgment reversed, with instructions to sustain the demurrer to
the complaint, and to proceed in accordance with this opinion.
The question presented in the princi-
pal case is an unusual one. A tenancy
by eutiretic3 occurs whenei-er an estate
vests in two persons, they being, when
it so vests, husband and wife. It is not
necessary that they should be married
when the grant, gift or devise is made,
or descent cast, but only when the estate
ve.sts. ".hus, if they marry before the
datit of a tWbtator and after the cxccu-
tin ,,f hi, will; or ifa feofliment is made
to them u hile single, but livery of seisin
d.as not t.ke place until after their mar-
riage ; or if they, after marriage, recover
oit a vouier of warranty annexed to an
c:tat,, of which they are joint-tenauts be-
0wre ,ncb marriage, in all these cases they
t:,ke by entireties: Jickling Anal. L. &
1:q. E~tates- 252 ; Co. Litt. I187 ; Pich-
e'is v. Nicholls, cited in Yin. Ahr. Baron
6- J-me; Plowd. Com. 483; Freeman
on Co-tenancy, scct. 63; 2 Black. Com.
182; 2 Iceton on Abstracts 39; 1
Preston Est. 131 ; Gillan v. Dixon, 65
Penn. St. 395.
In joint estates there are four requi-
sites, viz. : unity of interest, unity of
title, unity of time and unity of posses-
sion : 2 Black. Com. 357. But an addi-
tional requisite is necessary in a tenancy
by entireties, viz. : but two persons can
hold it, and they must be husband, and
wife at the time the estate vests" while
any numnber can be jpint-tenants: Top-
ping v. Sadler, 5 Jones (N. C.) L. 357.
Each has the entire estate, and are not.
seised by moieties. "They are seised,
not per my et per tout, but solely and sim-
ply per tout." Derr v. Hardenburgh, 5
Halst. (N. J.) 42 ; s. C. 18 Am. Dec.
371. It has been said that the husband
and wife "take but one estate as a cor-
poration would take, being by the common
law deemed but one person:" Taul v.
Campbell, 7 Yerg. 319; s. 0. 27 Am.
fDec. 508. See Stuckey Y. Keefe's Exrs.,
26 Penn. St. 399.
In an early case, a conveyance to hus-
band and wife conveyed the estate "to
them and their heirs." The husband
was attainted of treason and executed,
his wife surviving him. The king there-
upon granted the land to a third person
and his heirs. In a petition to the king
the widow disclosed the entire matter;
and upon scirefacias against the king's
patentee, recovered the lands : 1 Inst.
187, a; I Greeul. Crim. 841.
The principle underlying this case has
been frequently followed in England and
America. In the case just referred to,
the wife, at the death of her husband,
became instantly seised of the estate, to
the exclusion of the king and her hus-
band's heirs. We cite a few cases from
different states: Bach v. Andrews, 2
Vern. 120 ; s. c. Prec. Ch. 1 ; Doe v.
TiFlson, 21 B. & A. 303 ; Comm. v. Ken-
nedy, nl.ass. 211; Thornton v'.T1orn-
ton, 3 Rand. 179; Stuckey V. Kerfe, 26
Penn. St. 399 ; Gibson v. Zimmerman,
12 Mo. 385 ; Lux v. Hoff, 47 Ill. 427;
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Davis v. Clark, 26 Ind. 424 ; Halet v.
Inlon, 57 Ind. 412; a. o. 26 Am. Rep.
64; Doe v. Garrison, I Dana 45;
Harding v. Springer, 14 Me. 407 ;
Fisher v. Provin, 25 Mich. 347 ; Duffy.
Beauchamp, 50 Miss. 531; Hemingway
v. Scales, .42 Miss. 1 ; a. c. 2 Am.
Rep. 586 ; Woodford v. Bigly, I Winst.
237; WHight v. Sadler, 20 N. Y. 320;
Thomas v. DeBaum, 1 McCarter Ch.
40; Ames v. Norman, 4 Sneed 692;
Brownson v. Hull, 16 Vt. 309 ; Ketchum
v. Wolsworth, 5 Wis. 95; Robinson v.
Eagle, 29 Ark. 202.
Statutes abolishing joint tenancies do
not affect a tenancy by ehtireties there-
after created; and a statute providing
that if real estate is conveyed to two or
more they shall hold it as tenants in
common, unless otherwise expressed in
the instrument of conveyance, does not
render husband and wife tenants in com-
mon of estates conveyed to them while
the statute is in force : In re Shover, 31
Q. B. (U. C.) 605; Doe v. Harden-
bergh, 5 Halst. 42; a. c. 18 Amer. Dec.
371 ; Shaw v. Hearsey, 5 Mass. 521 ;
Jackson v. Stevens, 16 Johns. 115;
Thornton v. Thornton, 3 Rand. 179;
Hemingway v. Scales, 42 Miss. 1 ; a. c.
2 Am. Rep. 586; McCurdy v. Canning,
64 Penn. St. 39.
In Connecticut and Ohio joint tenan-
cies do not exist; and reasoning from
this, the courts refuse to recognise.tenan-
ties by entirety-a wrong conclusion:
Whittlesey v. Fuller, 14 Conn. 340;
Sergeant v. Steinberger, 2 Ohio 305 ;
Wilson v. Sleming, 13 Id. 68; Penn v.
Cox, 16 Id. 30. See Sloan v. Frothing-
ham, 72 Ala. 589, and Bradley v. Love,
60 Tex. 472.
If real estate is conveyed to husband
and wife and a third person, they take
one moiety and he the other: Litt., sect.
291 ; Doe v. Hardenbergh, 5 Halst. 42;
a. c. 18 Amer. Dec. 371 ; Doer. Wilson,
4 B. & A. 303; Barber v. Harris, 15
Wend. 615; Back v. Andrew, 2 Vern.
120; Bricker v. Whatley, 1 Id. 233;
In re W lde, 2 D., M. & G. 724; and
the same is true in case of legacies :
Gordon v. Whieldon, 18 L. J. Rep. (N. S.)
Ch. 5; Atcheson v. Atcheson, 18 L. J.
Rep. (N. S.) Ch. 230; a. a. 11 Beav.
485; see Johnson v. Hart, 6 W. & S.
919; a. c. 40 Amer. Dec. 565; War-
rington v. Warrington, 12 Hare 56.
If lands vest in a woman and man
before they marry, after marriage they
hold it either as tenants in common or
as joint-tenants: Moody v. Moody,
Amb. 649; Bevins v. Cline, 21 Ind.
37 ; Chandler v. Cheney, 37 Id. 391.
In an old case it was said, that "the
same words of conveyance which would
make two other persons joint-tenants,
will make a husband and wife tenants
by the entirety, so that neither can sever
the jointure, but the whole must accrue
to the survivor:", Green v. King, 2 W.
Bla. 1213. See also, Martin v. Jackson,
27 Penn. St. 504; Doe v. Parratt, 5 T.
R. 652; Farmers' Bank v. Gregory, 49
Barb. 155; Doe v. Hardenbergh, 5 Halst.
45; s. o. 18 Amer. Dec. 371; Goelet
v. Gori, 31 Barb. 314, for like state-
ments. A conveyance or devise 'to
them," naming them, creates such a ten-
ancy: Ham v. Weisenhelter, 9 Watts
359. But a conveyance made to hus-
band and wife at her request, has been
held a conveyance to her, because, it
was held, it would be presumed she
acted under coercion: Moore v. Moore,
12 B. Mon. 664; Babbitt v. Scroggin, 1
Dar. 273. It is not necessary to name
the grantees as husband and wife: Chand-
ler v. Cheney, 37 Ind. 391 ; see 1 Wash.
Real Prop. 577.
But a conveyance to Celestine Beal
and John Beali to be held by Celestine,
"as her own property, 'John having the
possession of the same during his life-
time ; the possession to return to Celes-
tine if she survives John," and both to
pay taxes then due, was held .to vest in
her the title in fee subject to his life-
estate only if he survives her: Edwards
v. Beale, 75 Ind. 401.
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The principal case is one of the few
that recognise the doctrine that husband
and wife may take an estate as joint
tenants or tenants in common. This has
been a mooted question ; there are dicta
that they can only take an estate as ten-
ants by entireties: Green v. King, 2 W.
Bla. 121; Rogers v. Benson, 5 Johns.
Ch. 477 ; Jackson v. Stevens, 16 Johns.
115 ; Barber v. Harris, 15 Wend. 617 ;
and there are cases that though a bond
be conveyed to them as tenants in com-
mon, they hold it as tenants by entire-
ties, because there is "a legal incapacity
to take in severalty, arising from a legal
identity ; and a grantor cannot remove
that incapacity without the intervention
of a trustee :" Dias v. Glover, I Hoff.
Ch. 76. To same effect: Stuckey v.
Keefe, 26 Penn. St. 400; Pollock v.
Kelley, 6 Irish L. R. (N. S). 373. In
the Pennsylvania case it is said, and this
is the basis of the decision, that during
coverture, husband and wife cannot hold
or enjoy any other estate ; yet this is
manifestly incorrect, for if they are ten-
ants in common, or even joint tenants
before marriage, their coverture does not
change the nature of the estate, and they
still continue to hold the estate in the same
way. See McDermott v. French, 15 N.
J. Eq. 89. So if a co-tenant of the hus-
band convey his interest to the husband's
wife, she becomes a tenant in common
.3cDermott v. French, 15 N. J. Eq. 80.
There are dicta also that husband and
wife may hold as joint tenants or in com-
mon: Chandler v. Cheney, 77 Ind. 391 ;
31arbury v. Cole, 49 Id. 402 ; s. c. 33
Amer. Rep. 266.
If the husband has no control over the
wife's separate estate, he cannot exclude
her from the enjoyment of an estate held
by them as tenants by entireties ; he can-
not lease it, nor sell it without her con-
sent: Bevine v. Cline, 21 Ind. 37 ; Arnold
v. Arnold, 30 Id. 305. If a statute pro-
hibit her going his security, then she
cannot bind the estate by joining with
him in a mortgage to secure the payment
of his debt. Such a mortgage is a nullity:
Dodge v. Kinzy, 101 Ind. 102 ; s. c. 18
Cent. Law Jour. 173.
His conviction of treason does not work
a forfeiture of the estate, although it
does of his separate estate : 11ashburn v.
Burns, 34 N. J. L. 19 ; Beaumont's Case;
9 Rep. 140, k; Co. Litt. 147, a.
At common law the husband has the
right to take possession of his wife's sep-
arate estate ; or, as it has been said, he
acquires by marriage," during coverture,
the usufruct of all the real estate which
his wife has, in fee simple, fee tail, or for
life." This statement of the law has
been applied to tenancies by entireties ;
and during his life, or during coverture,
at least, he may dispose of the estate,
with her hubband : Moore v. Moore, 47 . mortgage it, or lease it ; but the exercise
N. Y. 467.
Preston adopts the rule that they can
hold otherwise than as tenants by entire-
ties, although he is inclined to somewhat
modify the rule as quoted in the princi-
pal case: see 2 Abstracts of Title 41.
Where a deed was made to husband and
wife, *" the one equal half part to each,"
it was held to make them tenants in com-
mon : Hicksv. Cochran, 4 Edw. Ch. 110.
So where the husband attempted to sell
his interest, and the purchaser brought a
partition suit against the wife, alleging
that they held as tenants in common, a,
demurrer to the bill was overruled :
of such power, beyond his life, if his
wife survive him, will be a nullity :
Taul v. Campbell, 7 Yerg. 319 ; s. c. 27
Am. Dec. 508; Ames v. Norman, 4
Sneed 683; Den v. Gardner, 1 Spencer
(N.J.) 556; s. C. 45 Am. Dec. 388;
Barber v. Harris, 15 Wend. 615 ; Jack-
son v. McConnell, 19 Ed. 175 ; s. c. 32
Am. Dec. 439 ; Jones v. Patterson, 11
Barb. 572 : Beach v. ffollister, 3 Hun
519; Meekes v. Uright, 11 Id. 533;
Farmer v. Gregory, 49 Barb. 155 ; Tor-
rey v. Torrey, 14 X. Y. 430; UcCardy
v. Canning. 64 Penn. St. 40; Bennett v.
Child, 19 Wis. 765; Bates v. Dandy, 2
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Atk. 207 ; Watts v. Thomas, 2 F. Wins.
364 ; Draper v. Jackson, 16 Mass. 486."
If the husband, without her consent,
contracts for the building of a house upon
the real estate, a mechanic's lien for
building the house is good for his life,
but no longer if she survive him: Wash-
burn v. Burns, 34 N. J. L. 19. Both
may mortgage it, even to secure the hus-
band's debt, if no statute prohibits her
becoming his security: Dodge v. Kinzy,
supra; it is a valid mortgage: McDuff
v. Beauthorp, 50 Miss. 531 ; and if either
die, the mortgage is still good: Berrigan
v. 1.leming, 2 Lea 271.
So if the husband may mortgage or sell
it for his life, it may be sold on execu-
tion against him ; Ames v. Norman, 4
Sneed 692; Taul v. Campbell, 7 Yerg.
319; s. c. 27 Am. Dec. 508; Bennett
v. Child, 19 Wis. 362 ; Brown v. Gale,
5 N. H. 416; French v. Mehan, 56
Penn. St. 289; Brownson -i. Hull, 16
Vt. 309.
But where he cannot sell or mortgage
the estate for his life, there are authori-
ties which hold a sale of it on execution
as utterly void: 27wmas v. De Baum, 14
N. J. Eq. 37 ; Jackson v. McConnell, 19
Wend. 178; Almond v. Bonnell, 76 III.
536; Chandler v. Chieney, 37 Ind. 391,
408 ; Bevine v. C7ine, 21 Id. 37 ; Simp-
son v. Pearson, 31 Id. 1 ; Falls v. Raw-
thorn, 30 Id. 444; Rulet v. Inlow, 57
Id. 412 ; Dazis v. Clark, 26 Jd. 454 ; 0
Kife v. Kife, 33 N. Y. Eq. 2!3 ; Cur-
tis v. Gooding, 97 Ind. 45 ; Barren Creek
Ditching Co. v. Beck, 99 Id. 247; Bar-
tles v. Nunen, 97 N. Y. 152 ; Zorntlein
v. Brain, 2 N. E. Rep. 388.
A crop raised upon the land held by
them, as such tenant, ctnnot be sold (un-
less the law gives him possession of the
land) on an execution against him alone ;
n6r on one against her alone: Patton v.
Rankin, 68 Ind. 245.
In such an estate there can be no par-
tition, because husband and wife are one
in law : Chandler v. Cheney, 37 Ind.
391 ; Strawn v. trawn, 50 Ill. 33 ;
Cooper v. Cooper, 76 Id. 57 - Harrer v.
Wallner, 80 Id. 196 ; but when divorced
they become tenants in common or joint
tenants, and partition may then be had:
Ames v. Norman, 4 Sneed 696 ; .arrar
v. Wallner, 80 Ill. 197 ; Lash v. Lash,
58 Ind. 526 ; 2 Bright on Husband and
Wife 365. But it was said that if the
husband has alienated such property
during coverture, the alienee takes a title
not dependent on a continuance of the
marital relations ; and that .the wife,
after the divorce is granted, is not enti-
tled to the possession of her moiety from
her husband's grantee. The purchase
"not made in view of the contingency"
of the wife's divorce, cannot be affected
by it: Ames v. Norman, 4 Sneed 696.
Where a wife endeavored to exchange
her real estate for other real estate,
under the agreement that the title to that
received should be taken in her name,
and, without her knowledge or consent
the title was taken in the name of the
husband, and the real estate so received
was exchanged by the husband and wife,
with money belonging to the husband,
for other real estate, the title to which
was taken in their names jointly; the
real estate last transferred by them, it
was held, was not the property of the
husband, in considering the question
whether or not the title to the real estate
for which it was exchanged was taken in
the name of the husband and wife for the
purpose of defrauding creditors of the hus-
band : McConnell v. Martin, 52 Ind. 534.
Where dower existed, a wife joined
in a deed of conveyance of land held by
entireties, executed by her husband, in
token of her release of dower, "and of
her free consent thereto," without being
named in the granting clliuse. It was
held that her interest, on the death of the
husband, was not destroyed by this deed :
lralerv. Coffin, 13 Allen 213 ; Strawn
v. Strawn, 50 Ill. 33. But if both are
named in the deed as parties of the first
part, and afterwards the parties of the
first part are named as grantors, it is the
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deed of both : Thornton v. Exchange
Bank, 71 Mo. 221.
Upon the ground that the husband had
control over the premises, a sale of liquor
by the wife, where a statute prohibited a
sale without license, and rendered the
owner of the house, where the sale was
made fineable upon proof of it, it was
held, renders him liable to the fine:
Comnonwealtl v. Kennedy, 119 Mass.
211.
Husband and wife may reserve a life-
estate, and hold it as tenants by entire-
ties : Jones v. Potter, 89 N. C. 220. If
the deed is to them jointly, it cannot be
shown by parol that they hold as tenants
in common : Jacobs v. Mfiller, 50 Mich.
119 : see 31lers v. Reed, 17 Red. Rep.
401.
The usual married woman's enabling
acts do not abolish tenancies by entire-
ties, simply because they enable a mar-
ried woman to hold and control a separate
estate: Myers v. Reed, 17 Fed. Rep.
401 ; Bertler v. Noonan, 92- N. Y. 162 ;
s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 361 ; Farmers' Bank
v. Gregory, 49 Barb. 155 ; Beach v.
IHollister, 3 Ilun 319 ; Robinson v. Eagle,
29 Ark. 202; contra, M1eeker v. Wfright,
76 2N. Y. 262 ; Matteson v. N. Y. Cent.
Rd., 62 Barb. 373: Feaj v. Buckley,
48 HIun 451 ; Direr v. Diver, 56 Penn.
St. 106 ; Iaffman v. &ligers, 28 Ia.
307 ; Clark v. Clark, 56 N. I. 105;
Cooper v. Cooper, 76 Ill. 57.
Upon the second point decided in the
principal case we cite a few cases.
In Fountain County Coal. 4- ihfin-
ing Co. v. Beckleheimer, relied upon in
the principal case, it was said that
"words deliberately put into a deed, and
put there for a purpose, are not to be
lightly considered, or arbitrarily put
aside. Thewords in the deed before us
were deliberately written in the'instru-
ment, are there for a purpose, and, are
not without meaning. We can assign
them a meaning without encroaching
upon any rule of law, and, by doing
this, can give just effect to the intention
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of the grantor." Consequently a deed
by the grantor to his daughter, in con-
sideration of natural love and affection
"which he bears to his daughter * * *
and her present heirs," "to have and
hold the same to the said daughter, and
her present heirs, forever; the grantor,
his heirs and assigns, covenanting with
the grantee, her present heirs and as-
signs, that the title so conveyed is free,
clear, and unincumbered," was held to
convey to the daughter and her children
an estate in common; that the words
"her present heirs" meant heirs appar-
ent of the grantee ; and that they made
out a descriptio personarun, and were
words of purchase.
So a devise to the "lawful heirs of
A.," when it appears in the will that he
is living, is equivalent as a description to
a devise to his next of kin, or to his
children: Simms v. Garrett, 1 Dev. &
Bat. 393. So a devise to "A. and his
heirs now living" was held a good devise
to A.'s children: Goodright v. 1174ite, 2
IV. BI. 1010. See Hearne v. 11orton,
I Denio 165; James v. Richardson, I
Vent. 334 ; Roberts v. Oybourne, 37 Ala.
175 ; Powell v. Glenn, 21 Id. 458.
So a devise to the testator's brother's
"legal heirs," to his sister's "legal
heirs," and to his brother-in-law's " le-
gal heirs," " to be divided equally
between each of the heirs above named
after the decease of my wife," was held
to refer to the children of the brothers,
sisters and brother-in-law : Vonnorsdall
v. Van Deventer, 51 Barb. 137; see
Blake v. Stone, 27 Vt. 475 (a deed) ;
R-ior v. Quackenbush, 29 Ind. 475 (a
deed).
But where lands were devised to M.,
until his youngest child became of age,
"upon the happening of which event the
fee simple of said lands shall then vest
absolutely in the said M., and his heirs,
and may by him or them be disposed of
as he or they may judge best, for his or
their interest ;" it was held, that the
devise vested in 3. an estate in fee sim-
